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I. INTRODUCTION 
In the past few years, many scholars and commentators have 
explored why the West has been more economically developed and 
technologically advanced than other parts of the world.  In his new 
book, Civilization: The West and the Rest, renowned historian Niall 
Ferguson identified six “killer applications” that have helped the West 
achieve its rise to global dominance.1  In a cautiously titled book, Why 
the West Rules—for Now, archaeologist-historian Ian Morris also 
questioned why the West has dominated the globe for the past two 
centuries and whether such dominance would continue amid the rise of 
China, India, and other emerging powers.2  Using a different entry point, 
Newsweek International editor Fareed Zakaria explored the “rise of the 
rest,” discussing how global powers could shape up in what he called the 
“Post-American World.”3  Although all of these books carry a mostly 
positive message, they were all written against a background of growing 
worries that the West will eventually lose its competitive edge. 
Indeed, the release of these books has coincided with the growing 
attention commentators are now paying to the rise of Asia.  While some 
wonder whether the twenty-first century will be the Asia Century,4 
 
1.  NIALL FERGUSON, CIVILIZATION: THE WEST AND THE REST 13 (2011). 
 2.  IAN MORRIS, WHY THE WEST RULES—FOR NOW: THE PATTERNS OF HISTORY, 
AND WHAT THEY REVEAL ABOUT THE FUTURE (2010). 
 3.  FAREED ZAKARIA, THE POST-AMERICAN WORLD (2008). 
 4.  See, e.g., MARK BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC: ASEAN, APEC 
AND BEYOND 3 (2008) (noting the “overblown hyperbole about the ‘Asian Century’”); 
Symposium, The Asian Century?, 44 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 715 (2011) (interrogating whether 
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others have examined the growing role of the so-called BRICS 
countries,5 which initially included Brazil, China, India, and Russia but 
have now been generalized to cover other emerging middle-income 
countries, such as South Africa.6  A growing number of books have also 
looked at the role of China and India in Africa and Latin America.7  
 
this century will be the “Asian Century”).  Some commentators, however, are more certain.  
See, e.g., STEVE CHAN, CHINA, THE US AND THE POWER-TRANSITION THEORY: A 
CRITIQUE ix (2007) (“It is anticipated that by the year 2025, seven of the world’s ten largest 
economies will be located in Asia.”); ODED SHENKAR, THE CHINESE CENTURY: THE 
RISING CHINESE ECONOMY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE GLOBAL ECONOMY, THE BALANCE 
OF POWER, AND YOUR JOB (2005) (declaring the twenty-first century as the “Chinese 
Century”); EDWARD TSE, THE CHINA STRATEGY: HARNESSING THE POWER OF THE 
WORLD’S FASTEST-GROWING ECONOMY 6 (2010) (stating that “one of the safer predictions 
for the first half of the twenty-first century is that China’s growth, supported by that of India 
and several other countries, will make Asia the source of more than half the world’s gross 
domestic product by around 2030”). 
 5.  See Dominic Wilson & Roopa Purushothaman, Dreaming with BRICs: The Path to 
2050 (Goldman Sachs, Global Economics Paper No. 99), available at 
http://www2.goldmansachs.com/ideas/brics/book/99-dreaming.pdf (advancing the concept of 
the BRICs countries); see also PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, THE WORLD IN 2050: THE 
ACCELERATING SHIFT OF GLOBAL ECONOMIC POWER: CHALLENGES AND 
OPPORTUNITIES 3 (2011), available at http://www.pwc.com/en_GX/gx/world-2050/pdf/world-
in-2050-jan-2011.pdf (“E7 [China, India, Brazil, Russia, Indonesia, Mexico and Turkey] 
would overtake the G7 before 2040.”). 
 6.  See, e.g., CHIDI OGUAMANAM, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE: THE CRISIS OF EQUITY IN THE NEW KNOWLEDGE ECONOMY 221–22 (2012) 
(expanding BRICS to cover other emerging middle-income economies); Peter K. Yu, Access 
to Medicines, BRICS Alliances, and Collective Action, 34 AM. J.L. & MED. 345, 346 (2008) 
[hereinafter Yu, Access to Medicines] (expanding the BRICS acronym to cover South Africa); 
Sébastien Hervieu, South Africa Gains Entry to BRIC Club, GUARDIAN WKLY. (Apr. 19, 
2011, 09:04 AM), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2011/apr/19/south-africa-joins-bric-club 
(reporting about the South African president joining his counterparts from Brazil, Russia, 
India, and China for the third summit meeting of the informal group in China). 
 7.  See, e.g., AFRICAN PERSPECTIVES ON CHINA IN AFRICA (Firoze Manji & Stephen 
Marks eds., 2007); CHRIS ALDEN, CHINA IN AFRICA: PARTNER, COMPETITOR OR 
HEGEMON? (Alex De Waal & Richard Dowden eds., 2007); DEBORAH BRAUTIGAM, THE 
DRAGON’S GIFT: THE REAL STORY OF CHINA IN AFRICA (2009); HARRY G. BROADMAN, 
AFRICA’S SILK ROAD: CHINA AND INDIA’S NEW ECONOMIC FRONTIER (2007); PÁDRAIG 
CARMODY, THE NEW SCRAMBLE FOR AFRICA (2011); CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING 
WORLD: BEIJING’S STRATEGY FOR THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (Joshua Eisenman et al. 
eds., 2007) [hereinafter CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD]; CHINA INTO AFRICA: 
TRADE, AID, AND INFLUENCE (Robert I. Rotberg ed., 2008); CHINA RETURNS TO AFRICA: 
A RISING POWER AND A CONTINENT EMBRACE (Chris Alden et al. eds., 2008); CHINA’S 
EXPANSION INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE: IMPLICATIONS FOR LATIN AMERICA AND 
THE UNITED STATES (Riordan Roett & Guadalupe Paz eds., 2008) [hereinafter CHINA’S 
EXPANSION INTO THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE]; CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN AFRICA AND THE 
SOUTH: A SEARCH FOR A NEW PERSPECTIVE (Dorothy-Grace Guerrero & Firoze Manji 
eds., 2008) [hereinafter CHINA’S NEW ROLE]; ROBERT EVAN ELLIS, CHINA IN LATIN 
AMERICA: THE WHATS AND WHEREFORES (2009); KEVIN GALLAGHER & ROBERTO 
PORZECANSKI, THE DRAGON IN THE ROOM: CHINA AND THE FUTURE OF LATIN 
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Some even contrast the oft-criticized “Washington Consensus”8 with the 
“Beijing Consensus,” a term coined by former Time foreign editor 
Joshua Ramo.9  In March 2011, the Associated Press launched the global 
economic tracker, examining developments in emerging developing 
countries.10  As the press reasoned, these developments are likely to 
have important global implications ranging from increased prices for 
 
AMERICAN INDUSTRIALIZATION (2010); GEOFFREY KEMP, THE EAST MOVES WEST: 
INDIA, CHINA, AND ASIA’S GROWING PRESENCE IN THE MIDDLE EAST (2010); BEN 
SIMPFENDORFER, THE NEW SILK ROAD: HOW A RISING ARAB WORLD IS TURNING AWAY 
FROM THE WEST AND REDISCOVERING CHINA (2009); IAN TAYLOR, CHINA AND AFRICA: 
ENGAGEMENT AND COMPROMISE (2006); IAN TAYLOR, CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN AFRICA 
(2009); THE RISE OF CHINA AND INDIA IN AFRICA: CHALLENGES, OPPORTUNITIES AND 
CRITICAL INTERVENTIONS (Fantu Cheru & Cyril Obi eds., 2010). 
 8.  John Williamson, an economist and a senior fellow of the Institute for International 
Economics, coined the term “Washington Consensus.”  John Williamson, What Washington 
Means by Policy Reform, in LATIN AMERICAN ADJUSTMENT: HOW MUCH HAS HAPPENED? 
7 (John Williamson ed., 1990).  The Washington Consensus was derived from 
recommendations in ten different areas: (1) fiscal deficits; (2) public expenditure priorities; 
(3) tax reform; (4) interest rates; (5) the exchange rate; (6) trade policy; (7) foreign direct 
investment; (8) privatization; (9) deregulation; and (10) property rights.  Id. 
 9.  JOSHUA COOPER RAMO, THE BEIJING CONSENSUS 4 (2004), available at 
http://fpc.org.uk/fsblob/244.pdf.  As he explained: 
[The Beijing Consensus] is simply three theorems about how to organise the place of 
a developing country in the world, along with a couple of axioms about why the 
physics is attracting students in places like New Delhi and Brasilia.  The first 
theorem repositions the value of innovation.  Rather than the “old-physics” 
argument that developing countries must start development with trailing-edge 
technology (copper wires), it insists that on the necessity of bleeding-edge 
innovation (fiber optic) to create change that moves faster than the problems 
change creates.  In physics terms, it is about using innovation to reduce the friction-
losses of reform. 
 The second Beijing Consensus theorem is that since chaos is impossible to 
control from the top you need a whole set of new tools.  It looks beyond measures 
like per-capita GDP and focuses instead of quality-of-life, the only way to manage 
the massive contradictions of Chinese development.  This second theorem demands 
a development model where sustainability and equality become first considerations, 
not luxuries.  Because Chinese society is an unstable stew of hope, ambition, fear, 
misinformation and politics only this kind of chaos-theory can provide meaningful 
organization. 
 Finally, the Beijing Consensus contains a theory of self-determination, one that 
stresses using leverage to move big, hegemonic powers that may be tempted to tread 
on your toes. 
Id. at 11–12.  For discussions of the Beijing Consensus, see generally id.; STEFAN A. HALPER, 
THE BEIJING CONSENSUS: HOW CHINA’S AUTHORITARIAN MODEL WILL DOMINATE THE 
TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY (2010). 
 10. Paul Wiseman, Developing Nations’ Rise Poses Risks for Rich Ones, MSNBC.COM 
(Mar. 30, 2011, 1:44 AM), http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/42329602/ns/business-
world_business/. 
NEW YU- FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  6:56 PM 
2012]     INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ASIAN VALUES 333 
 
raw materials to an accelerated pace of global economic recovery.11 
The last time policymakers and commentators paid such an 
enormous amount of attention to Asia was two decades ago, amid the 
rise of Japan and other newly industrialized countries.  The elevated 
status of these countries, in turn, led some Asian leaders to declare the 
need to recognize, promote, and protect the so-called “Asian values,” 
which they claimed had provided a formula for economic success,12 or 
the so-called “East Asian miracle.”13  Although today’s discourse seems 
to be going in the same direction as that of two decades ago, it is 
actually quite different.  The present discourse is not simply about the 
economic rise of Asia.  Rather, it touches on how China, India, and 
other countries in the region have greatly improved their 
competitiveness and technological capabilities.  To some extent, these 
countries are now threatening to compete with the West on its home 
turf while playing its own game. 
Indeed, a growing volume of literature has now focused on the role 
of the BRICS countries in the international intellectual property 
system14—an area that was once dominated by Western developed 
countries.  Such literature complements nicely the ever-growing volume 
of books and articles on intellectual property law developments in 
China and India.15  In a recent article, leading international intellectual 
 
 11. Id. 
 12. See discussion Part I.A. 
 13. WORLD BANK, THE EAST ASIAN MIRACLE: ECONOMIC GROWTH AND PUBLIC 
POLICY (1993).  See generally HA-JOON CHANG, THE EAST ASIAN DEVELOPMENT 
EXPERIENCE: THE MIRACLE, THE CRISIS AND THE FUTURE (2006) (discussing the Asian 
miracle and the ensuing economic crisis). 
 14. See, e.g., Robert C. Bird, Defending Intellectual Property Rights in the BRIC 
Economies, 43 AM. BUS. L.J. 317 (2006); Robert C. Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Emerging 
BRIC Economies: Lessons from Intellectual Property Negotiation and Enforcement, 5 NW. J. 
TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 400 (2007); Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6; Rochelle C. 
Dreyfuss, The Role of India, China, Brazil and Other Emerging Economies in Establishing 
Access Norms for Intellectual Property and Intellectual Property Lawmaking (Int’l Law & 
Justice, New York University School of Law, Working Paper No. 2009/5, 2009), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1442785. 
 15. See, e.g., Daniel Chow, Anti-Counterfeiting Strategies of Multi-National Companies 
in China: How a Flawed Approach Is Making Counterfeiting Worse, 41 GEO. J. INT’L L. 749 
(2010); Daniel C.K. Chow, Counterfeiting in the People’s Republic of China, 78 WASH. U. 
L.Q. 1 (2000); Daniel C.K. Chow, Why China Does Not Take Commercial Piracy Seriously, 32 
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 203 (2006); Amy Kapczynski, Harmonization and Its Discontents: A Case 
Study of TRIPS Implementation in India’s Pharmaceutical Sector, 97 CAL. L. REV. 1571 
(2009); Janice M. Mueller, The Tiger Awakens: The Tumultuous Transformation of India’s 
Patent System and the Rise of Indian Pharmaceutical Innovation, 68 U. PITT. L. REV. 491 
(2007); Srividhya Ragavan, Of the Inequals of the Uruguay Round, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. 
L. REV. 273 (2006); Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners: Protecting Intellectual Property in 
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property scholar Jerome Reichman questioned whether developing 
countries should follow the developed countries’ lead in adopting their 
intellectual property system or whether they should lead in the 
knowledge economy by building their own comparative advantages.16  
As he declared: 
To the extent that intellectual property laws do play an ancillary 
but important role, there are, roughly speaking, two different 
approaches on the table.  One is to play it safe by sticking to 
time-tested IP solutions implemented in OECD [Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development] countries, with 
perhaps a relatively greater emphasis on the flexibilities still 
permitted under TRIPS (and not overridden by relevant FTAs). 
The other approach is to embark on a more experimental 
path . . . that advanced technology countries currently find so 
daunting.17 
One set of questions commentators have yet to explore concerns 
whether Asian countries will take unified positions on international 
intellectual property law and policy.  Can we identify any underlying 
“Asian values,” approaches, or practices in the area?  Are the 
developments in Asia homogenous enough to foster common positions 
within the region?  Does it matter whether any of the Asian countries 
can attain hegemonic status on the continent?  If Asia indeed will 
assume a more dominant global role in the future, as commentators 
have claimed, which countries will be involved, how will they be 
involved, and what issues will be found on their policy agendas? 
These questions are important for at least two reasons.  First, given 
the growing attention scholars have paid to Asia and the so-called 
BRICS countries, a systematic analysis of the role these countries will 
play in future international intellectual property negotiations is likely to 
provide a better understanding of the international intellectual property 
 
China in the Twenty-first Century, 50 AM. U. L. REV. 131 (2000) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates 
to Partners]; Peter K. Yu, From Pirates to Partners (Episode II): Protecting Intellectual 
Property in Post-WTO China, 55 AM. U. L. REV. 901 (2006) [hereinafter Yu, From Pirates to 
Partners II]; Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property, Economic Development, and the China 
Puzzle, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, TRADE AND DEVELOPMENT: STRATEGIES TO 
OPTIMIZE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT IN A TRIPS PLUS ERA 173 (Daniel J. Gervais ed., 
2007) [hereinafter Yu, China Puzzle]. 
 16. Jerome H. Reichman, Intellectual Property in the Twenty-First Century: Will the 
Developing Countries Lead or Follow?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 1115, 1126 (2009). 
 17. Id. at 1126.  
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system.  Second, intellectual property industries have repeatedly 
criticized China and Southeast Asian countries for their widespread 
piracy and counterfeiting problems.18  A better grasp of Asian 
developments will certainly help anticipate those challenges confronting 
the international intellectual property system. 
Part I of this Article examines intellectual property developments in 
relation to the decades-old “Asian values” debate.  Although the debate 
began in the human rights context, this Part uses the debate as a starting 
point to evaluate whether Asian cultures, practices, and conditions can 
help provide the needed rallying force to help Asia establish unified 
positions on intellectual property law and policy.  This Part further 
examines the region’s diversity in economic and technological 
developments and the continuous rivalry among the different regional 
powers.  This Part concludes that one can neither locate any distinct 
values, approaches, or practices on intellectual property law and policy 
nor identify any established pan-Asian positions in the area. 
Part II explores the role Asian countries will play if these emerging 
countries exert more influence on the development of the international 
intellectual property system.  Drawing on the earlier discussion 
concerning how Japan and, to some extent, South Korea are unlikely to 
team up with other Asian countries to develop a united front for the 
Asian developing world, this Part contends that Asian countries as a 
group may not be able to establish a position comparable to that of the 
European Union or the African Group.  Nevertheless, this Part argues 
that, if China, India, and members of the ASEAN (Association of 
Southeast Asian Nations)19 agree to team up to form a “Chindiasean” 
alliance, the resulting alliance will be a formidable force in future 
international intellectual property negotiations. 
Part III concludes with a discussion of ten key items that will find 
their way to Chindiasean’s common policy agenda if such an alliance is 
ultimately established.  Because of the alliance’s potential role in 
shaping global intellectual property norms, Chindiasean is as much a 
“normative community” as it is a political alliance.20  The first five items 
 
 18. See discussion infra Part III.A.1. 
 19. The ten current ASEAN members are Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, Indonesia, 
Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand, and Vietnam.  Member 
Countries, ASEAN SECRETARIAT, http://www.aseansec.org/74.htm (last visited Apr. 4, 2011). 
 20. SIMON TAY, ASIA ALONE: THE DANGEROUS POST-CRISIS DIVIDE FROM 
AMERICA 150 (2010) (advancing the concept of “Asia’s normative community”).  As 
Professor Tay explained, the development of an Asian normative community would offer at 
least three benefits: 
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in the agenda concern traditional issues advanced by less developed 
countries.  The remaining items represent new issues on which the 
international community has yet to achieve a consensus or formulate a 
position.  Taking a first look at this common policy agenda in the 
intellectual property literature, this Part seeks to provide insights into 
issues that will emerge in future international intellectual property 
negotiations. 
II. THE ASIAN VALUES DEBATE 
A. Human Rights 
The Asian values debate, which began in the human rights area, has 
been quite controversial.  Although it is hard to pinpoint which values 
are included in these so-called Asian values, commentators have 
generally defined such values to include “authoritarianism, cooperation, 
harmony, and order.”21  By embracing cultural relativism, critics argue, 
the Asian values debate “undermine[s] . . . the universality of the human 
rights regime as an empirical matter and present[s] a challenge to the 
normative claim that human rights should be interpreted and 
implemented in a similar manner everywhere.”22  The debate has also 
raised challenging questions about whether Asian countries, including 
those that have hitherto had a disappointing human rights record, could 
use Asian values as a “cultural excuse” for transgressions in the area.23 
 
The first of these is, of course, the solution to the issue [that needs cooperation in 
Asia].  Another would be to the benefit of the United States and China working 
alongside each other, but with potential frictions and awkwardness eased in a 
multilateral setting.  The third benefit for ASEAN and other Asians is that, unlike a 
G-2, they would have a role and be better assured that their fate would not be 
decided by the two powers without their participation. 
TAY, supra note 20, at 155. 
 21. See, e.g., Michael C. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture: The Debate over 
Human Rights and Asian Values, 11 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 109, 109 (1998) [hereinafter Davis, 
Constitutionalism and Political Culture] (noting that Asian values “seem to include 
authoritarianism, cooperation, harmony, and order as the predominant values of Asian 
culture”). 
 22. Randall Peerenboom, Beyond Universalism and Relativism: The Evolving Debates 
About “Values in Asia,” 14 IND. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 1, 7 (2003). 
 23. See Simon S.C. Tay, Human Rights, Culture, and the Singapore Example, 41 
MCGILL L.J. 743, 747 (1996) (noting that commentators “suspect that the cultural argument 
is a pretext to excuse continuing transgressions by repressive governments”); see also Michael 
Davis, Chinese Perspectives on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES: 
LEGAL, PHILOSOPHICAL, AND POLITICAL PERSPECTIVES 3, 22 (Michael C. Davis ed., 1995) 
[hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES] (“It is important to note that in the 
Bangkok Declaration Asian governments were formulating a response not only to a Western 
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Championed by Malaysian and Singaporean leaders,24 the “Asian 
values” debate reached its climax when Asian countries adopted the 
Bangkok Declaration at the Asian preparatory conference before the 
World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993.25  Although this 
state-coordinated declaration did not articulate the oft-discussed Asian 
values, it states explicitly that, “while human rights are universal in 
nature, they must be considered in the context of a dynamic and 
evolving process of international norm-setting, bearing in mind the 
significance of national and regional particularities and various 
historical, cultural and religious backgrounds.”26 
The position articulated in this declaration was attractive to many 
participants of the Asian regional conference, many of whom had 
repeatedly criticized the existing international human rights regime for 
ignoring non-Western interests.  The concern for a lack of cultural 
sensitivity is not new; it can be traced back to the regime’s inception.  
When the regime’s founding document, the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights,27 was drafted, the American Anthropological 
Association already sent a long memorandum to the Human Rights 
 
challenge but primarily to the challenge of their own people.”). 
 24. Cf. MARK BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION IN EAST ASIA: 
POLITICS, SECURITY AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 135 (2007) [hereinafter BEESON, 
REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION] (“In Southeast Asia, in particular, a number of 
prominent figures—including Malaysia’s Mahathir [bin Mohamad] and Singapore’s Lee Kuan 
Yew—were trumpeting the merits of ‘Asian values’ as an explanation for the region’s 
economic take-off.”). 
 25. World Conference on Human Rights, Regional Meeting for Asia, 29 March–2 
April 1993, Report of the Regional Meeting for Asia of the World Conference on Human 
Rights, U.N. Doc. A/Conf.157/PC/59 (Apr. 7, 1993), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/TestFrame/9d23b88f115fb827802569030037ed
44?Opendocument. 
 26. Id. ¶ 8.  For discussions of Asian values and the Bangkok Declaration, see 
generally DANIEL BELL, BEYOND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: POLITICAL THINKING FOR AN 
EAST ASIAN CONTEXT (2006) [hereinafter BELL, BEYOND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY]; 
DANIEL A. BELL, EAST MEETS WEST: HUMAN RIGHTS AND DEMOCRACY IN EAST ASIA 
(2000) [hereinafter BELL, EAST MEETS WEST]; CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Wm. 
Theodore de Bary & Tu Weiming eds., 1998); WM. THEODORE DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES 
AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A CONFUCIAN COMMUNITARIAN PERSPECTIVE (1998) [hereinafter 
DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES]; THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS (Joanne R. 
Bauer & Daniel A. Bell eds., 1999); HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note 23; 
HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE ASIA-PACIFIC REGION 208 
(James T.H. Tang ed., 1995) [hereinafter HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS]; Davis, Chinese Perspectives on Human Rights, supra note 23; Karen Engle, 
Culture and Human Rights: The Asian Values Debate in Context, 32 N.Y.U. J. INT’L L. & POL. 
291 (2000); Peerenboom, supra note 22; Tay, supra note 23. 
 27. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217, U.N. GAOR, 3d Sess. 
(1948). 
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Commission, expressing its concern, or even fear, that the Declaration 
would become an ethnocentric document.  As the association put it in 
the now infamous memorandum, “‘[t]he primary task’ the drafters faced 
was to find a solution to the following problem: ‘How can the proposed 
Declaration be applicable to all human beings and not be a statement of 
rights conceived only in terms of values prevalent in the countries of 
Western Europe and America?’”28 
Notwithstanding these concerns, the Bangkok Declaration was 
subsequently rejected at the Vienna Conference.29  Commentators have 
also widely questioned whether Asian values actually exist in the human 
rights area.  As Randall Peerenboom reminded us: 
[t]he “Asian values” debate was not a single debate, not only 
about values in Asia, and not only about universalism versus 
relativism.  Rather it was a series of debates about a range of 
issues.  It is a mistake to reduce the many complex debates to the 
politically charged and easily resolved issue of whether 
authoritarian governments (sometimes) have invoked culture to 
deny citizens in their countries their rights.  It does a disservice to 
the difficulty of the issues and the increasingly sophisticated and 
nuanced views of those who are trying to take diversity seriously 
to simply dismiss them as apologists for dictators.  Put more 
bluntly, it is intellectually lazy and emblematic of the arrogant 
and narrow-minded ethnocentricism that has led many in Asia, 
and elsewhere, to view the human rights movement as the latest 
neo-colonial attempt to impose with missionary zeal the values, 
 
 28. JOHANNES MORSINK, THE UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS: 
ORIGINS, DRAFTING, AND INTENT ix (1999) (quoting the 1947 memorandum from the 
American Anthropological Association to the U.N. Human Rights Commission); JOHN P. 
HUMPHREY, HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE UNITED NATIONS: A GREAT ADVENTURE 29 
(1983) (recalling in his memoirs that Chinese delegate Chang Peng-chun “suggested that [he] 
put [his] other duties aside for six months and study Chinese philosophy . . . [implying] that 
Western influences might be too great”); id. at 32 (“With two exceptions, all [of the draft 
documents he relied on in putting together his draft outline of provisions in the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (“UDHR”)] came from English-speaking sources and all of 
them from the democratic West.”).  But see Peter K. Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual 
Property Interests in a Human Rights Framework, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1039, 1143–44 
(2007) [hereinafter Yu, Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property Interests] (discussing the 
diverse cultural and religious backgrounds of delegates participating in the drafting of the 
UDHR). 
 29. Michael C. Davis, Preface to HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note 
23, at vii, viii. 
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institutions, and ways of life popular in the West on the Rest.30 
Interestingly, although there has been voluminous literature on 
Asian values, those discussions mostly reflect values in East Asia, as 
opposed to those found throughout Asia.  For example, a considerable 
amount of literature has focused on both the tension and compatibility 
between Confucianism and Western human rights.31  While 
Confucianism undoubtedly has some influence in many Asian countries, 
such as China, Japan, Singapore, South Korea, and Vietnam, it has less 
relevance to other Asian countries, especially those in South Asia.32  
Indeed, it was ironic that the locus of the Confucianism debate was in 
East Asia, while the Bangkok Declaration was adopted more than two 
thousand miles away in Thailand. 
B. Intellectual Property 
In recent years, the debate on Asian values in the human rights area 
has slowly disappeared.  Meanwhile, commentators have paid growing 
attention to intellectual property developments in Asia, due largely to 
the region’s rapid rise and the increasing interest in intellectual property 
and technology matters.  In light of these developments, this Part 
undertakes a holistic inquiry into whether any Asian values in 
intellectual property law and policy actually exist and whether one could 
identify unified pan-Asian positions in the area.  This Part focuses in 
particular on the region’s cultural, economic, technological, and 
geopolitical developments. 
 
 30. Peerenboom, supra note 22, at 1–2.  As he elaborated: 
Descriptive relativism holds that the moral beliefs, standards, values, or principles of 
individuals, groups or societies conflict in fundamental ways, and thus disagreements 
will remain in some cases even after all factual and logical disputes are resolved.  
These fundamental differences may be due to culture; variation in the personality, 
psychology, or experiences of individuals; or to other factors such as levels of 
economic development, the relative stability or instability of the state, and the 
likelihood of civil war or terrorism.  Virtually no one denies the truth of descriptive 
relativism.  Broad multi-country studies have found significant regional differences 
with respect to democratization, labor rights, women’s rights and personal integrity 
rights.  Most of the debate therefore is over two other forms of relativism, normative 
and metaethical relativism, or other related issues. 
Id. at 7–8. 
 31. See, e.g., BELL, BEYOND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 26; BELL, EAST 
MEETS WEST, supra note 26; CONFUCIANISM AND HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 26; DE 
BARY, ASIAN VALUES, supra note 26; THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
supra note 26; HUMAN RIGHTS AND CHINESE VALUES, supra note 23. 
 32. See infra discussion Part I.B.1. 
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1. Cultural Developments 
In the past two decades, commentators have used cultural 
differences to account for the massive piracy and counterfeiting 
problems in Asia.  Very typical are discussions of how Asian cultures, in 
particular Confucianism, have militated against intellectual property 
reforms.33  Similar discussions have also been made of the familial and 
community values and strong protection of the public interest as 
embodied in Islam.34  Although the latter discussions focus primarily on 
countries in the Middle East, they have high relevance to many Muslim-
majority countries in Asia, such as Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan.35 
As far as Confucianism is concerned, the starting point of most 
discussions is William Alford’s seminal work, To Steal a Book Is an 
 
 33. See WILLIAM P. ALFORD, TO STEAL A BOOK IS AN ELEGANT OFFENSE: 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN CHINESE CIVILIZATION 19–29 (1995) (discussing how 
the Confucian culture prevented intellectual property protection from taking root in imperial 
China); R. Michael Gadbaw, Republic of Korea, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS: 
GLOBAL CONSENSUS, GLOBAL CONFLICT? 272, 275 (R. Michael Gadbaw & Timothy J. 
Richards eds., 1988) (“An ‘intellectual property culture’ has yet to be developed in Korea.  
This cultural gap is typical of many East Asian countries, where the historical attitude toward 
intellectual property is noticeably different from that in the West.”); Patrick H. Hu, “Mickey 
Mouse” in China: Legal and Cultural Implications in Protecting U.S. Copyrights, 14 B.U. 
INT’L L.J. 81, 104 (1996) (“[P]unishing copyright violation contradicts traditional Chinese 
moral standards.”); Peter K. Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives: An Attempt to Use 
Shakespeare to Reconfigure the U.S.-China Intellectual Property Debate, 19 B.U. INT’L. L.J. 1, 
16–21 (2001) [hereinafter Yu, Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives] (discussing Confucianism as 
a partial impediment to improving intellectual property protection and enforcement in 
China). 
 34. See Lise Buranen, “But I Wasn’t Cheating”: Plagiarism and Cross-Cultural 
Mythology, in PERSPECTIVES ON PLAGIARISM AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN A 
POSTMODERN WORLD 63, 66 (Lise Buranen & Alice M. Roy eds., 1999) (discussing how 
some teachers attribute plagiarism by Middle Eastern students to the emphasis of community 
and family values in Middle Eastern cultures); Richard E. Vaughan, Defining Terms in the 
Intellectual Property Protection Debate: Are the North and South Arguing Past Each Other 
When We Say “Property”? A Lockean, Confucian, and Islamic Comparison, 2 ILSA J. INT’L 
& COMP. L. 307, 336 (1996) (noting the various cultural arguments that have been advanced 
to identify a distinctly different Islamic approach to copyright).  But see Silvia Beltrametti, 
The Legality of Intellectual Property Rights Under Islamic Law, in THE PRAGUE YEARBOOK 
OF COMPARATIVE LAW 2009, at 57 (T. Mach et al. eds. 2010) (“[S]ome basic forms of 
intellectual property rights can hardly be denied a claim under Shari’a.”).  For discussions of 
the protection of intellectual property rights under Shari’a, see generally Heba A. Raslan, 
Shari’a and the Protection of Intellectual Property—The Example of Egypt, 47 IDEA 497 
(2007); Chad M. Cullen, Note, Can TRIPS Live in Harmony with Islamic Law? An 
Investigation of the Relationship Between Intellectual Property and Islamic Law, 14 SMU SCI. 
& TECH. L. REV. 45 (2010). 
 35. See KEMP, supra note 7, at 241 (“With a population of more than 240 million 
people, almost 90 percent of which is Muslim, Indonesia is the world’s most populous Muslim 
country.”). 
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Elegant Offense.36  Although this provocative book has inspired a whole 
generation of intellectual property scholars studying developments in 
East Asia—myself included—it has also attracted some pointed 
criticisms.  For example, Shi Wei questioned whether the book’s catchy 
title actually created a misleading impression about the cultural values 
in China, including Confucianism.37  As he wrote: 
“To Steal a Book is an Elegant Offense” (Qie Shu Bu Suan 
Tou) . . . is a concept unknown to Confucianism and was only 
popularized with the 1919 publication of the popular fictional 
book Kong Yi Ji, written by the famous novelist Lu Xun.  In his 
book, Lu exemplifies his belief that literature should be socially 
relevant, and attempts to avoid the “clichés” of traditional 
Chinese linguistics that, in his view, had hampered and restrained 
people’s creative thinking for centuries.  In Lu Xun’s portrayal, 
Kong Yi Ji was depicted as a poor harlequin, who was “a big, 
pallid man whose wrinkled face often bore scars,” and was made 
fun of by everybody.  He earned a living from copying 
manuscripts for rich patrons and sometimes stole books to trade 
for wine.  His behavior drew on his being soundly beaten.  “To 
Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense” was his argument when he 
was taunted.  His personal character and way of thinking are thus 
far removed from the Confucian values. . . .  Indeed, the phrase 
“To Steal a Book Is an Elegant Offense” was unknown to 
Chinese until Kong Yi Ji as a fictional character appeared in the 
early twentieth century and, interestingly, it was unpopular with 
foreigners until Professor Alford’s book . . . made its debut in the 
mid 1990s.38 
Ken Shao also noted the many developments in China that Professor 
Alford did not cover.39  Questioning whether Professor Alford had 
presented an incomplete picture, Professor Shao encouraged us to 
reassess the impact of Confucianism on intellectual property protection 
and enforcement in China.40  As more research and archival records 
become available, this spirited debate will only advance even further. 
 
 36. ALFORD, supra note 33. 
 37. See Shi Wei, Cultural Perplexity in Intellectual Property: Is Stealing a Book an 
Elegant Offense?, 32 N.C. J. INT’L L. & COM. REG. 1, 11 (2006). 
 38. Id. (footnotes omitted). 
 39. See Ken Shao, The Global Debates on Intellectual Property: What If China Is Not a 
Born Pirate?, 2010 INTELL. PROP. Q. 341. 
 40. See id. 
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To fully understand the debate Professor Alford’s book has inspired, 
it is important to distinguish the weak form of his claim from its strong 
form.  The strong form states that Confucianism militates against 
intellectual property reforms in China.  It accounts for the failure of the 
many reforms pushed by foreign countries and intellectual property 
rights holders to induce improvements in intellectual property 
protection and enforcement. 
Although provocative, this strong form of the claim is likely not 
supported by the reality on Chinese soil.  As I pointed out in the past, 
there are striking similarities between Confucianism and what we have 
in the West regarding the public domain.41  While copying may be an 
important living process for a Confucian Chinese to acquire 
understanding of human behavior, to improve life through self-
cultivation, and to transmit knowledge to the posterity,42 Chinese poets 
and literary theorists widely disagreed on the appropriate extent of 
copying.43  If the Chinese did not subscribe to intellectual property 
notions, it is only those notions that were derived from a maximalist 
tradition, where the importance of the public domain is largely 
ignored.44 
Moreover, traditional Chinese culture does not always call for 
verbatim reproduction, the means by which massive piracy and 
counterfeiting are often conducted.  Rather, Confucianism has called for 
the transformative use of preexisting works that is tailored to the user’s 
needs and conditions.  As Professor Alford acknowledged, through the 
editing of the Classics and his comments in the Analects, Confucius 
demonstrated that “transmission, far from being a passive endeavor, 
entailed selection and adaptation if it was to be meaningful to oneself, 
 
 41. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 15, at 224–25; see also ALFORD, supra 
note 33, at 20 (“The indispensability of the past for personal moral growth dictated there be 
based access to the common heritage of all Chinese.”). 
 42. See ALFORD, supra note 33, at 28 (“Interaction with the past is one of the 
distinctive modes of intellectual and imaginative endeavor in traditional Chinese culture.” 
(internal quotations omitted) (quoting ARTISTS AND TRADITIONS: USES OF THE PAST IN 
CHINESE CULTURE xi (Christian Murck ed., 1976))).  The Chinese believed that “the essence 
of human understanding had long since been discerned by those who had gone before and, in 
particular, by the sage rulers collectively referred to as the Ancients who lived in a distant, 
idealized ‘golden age.’”  Id.  Subsequent generations thus have to interact thoroughly with the 
past in order to acquire this understanding to guide their behavior, to improve through self-
cultivation, and to transmit such knowledge to the posterity.  See id. at 25. 
 43. See id. at 26–29 (noting that Chinese poets and literary theorists disagreed on the 
appropriate use of past works). 
 44. For a recent discussion of the public domain, see generally JAMES BOYLE, THE 
PUBLIC DOMAIN: ENCLOSING THE COMMONS OF THE MIND (2010). 
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one’s contemporaries, and one’s successors.”45  Indeed, the ability to 
make transformative use of preexisting works can demonstrate one’s 
comprehension of and devotion to the core of the Chinese culture as 
well as the ability to distinguish the present from the past through 
original thoughts. 
To some extent, the need for meaningful transmission in traditional 
Chinese culture can be analogized to the transformative use doctrine 
pronounced by the U.S. Supreme Court in Campbell v. Acuff-Rose 
Music, Inc.46  In Campbell, a music publisher brought a copyright 
infringement action against the rap band 2 Live Crew for its salacious 
rap parody of Roy Orbison’s “Oh, Pretty Woman.”47  Emphasizing that 
transformative works are socially important and exploring whether fair 
use covers the contested parody, Justice Souter noted the importance of 
transformative works: 
Although . . . transformative use is not absolutely necessary for a 
finding of fair use, the goal of copyright, to promote science and 
the arts, is generally furthered by the creation of transformative 
works.  Such works thus lie at the heart of the fair use doctrine’s 
guarantee of breathing space within the confines of copyright, 
and the more transformative the new work, the less will be the 
significance of other factors, like commercialism, that may weigh 
against a finding of fair use.48 
In the end, the Court suggested that 2 Live Crew’s rendition of the song 
might have constituted fair use and remanded the case to the lower 
court.49 
Just as it is important to ask what the Confucian position of copying 
is, it is equally important to examine the Western position in intellectual 
property law and policy, if such a position exists at all.  Individualism 
alone, for example, does not fully summarize the Western intellectual 
property position.  In the past decade, intellectual property scholars 
have widely questioned the narrow and incomplete definition of 
intellectual property rights advanced by developed countries and their 
supportive rights holders.50  As the West develops more sophisticated 
 
 45. ALFORD, supra note 33, at 25. 
 46. 510 U.S. 569 (1994). 
 47. Id. at 572–73. 
 48. Id. at 579 (citations omitted). 
 49. See id. at 594. 
 50. See, e.g., James Boyle, Foreword: The Opposite of Property?, LAW & CONTEMP. 
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notions of intellectual property rights, it may find that these notions and 
Confucianism may be more compatible with each other than one has 
anticipated.51 
Compared with the strong form of Professor Alford’s claim, its weak 
form seems to be more in line with the reality on the ground, although 
native Chinese scholars continue to disagree with such an assessment.52  
This weak claim states that Confucianism has prevented Western 
notions of intellectual property rights from taking root in China.53  
Nevertheless, it does not suggest any incompatibility between the two 
notions.  Nor does it contend that Confucianism will militate against 
 
PROBS., Winter/Spring 2003, at 1, 32 (noting the importance of “look[ing] at the opposite of 
property [which refers to the limitations, negations, inversions and correctives of property] 
with the same historical care, analytical precision, and occasional utopian romanticism that 
we display when looking at property”); Michael A. Carrier, Cabining Intellectual Property 
Through a Property Paradigm, 54 DUKE L.J. 1, 52–144 (2004) (discussing the use of limits in 
property law to cabin intellectual property rights); Jacqueline Lipton, Information Property: 
Rights and Responsibilities, 56 FLA. L. REV. 135, 148 (2004) (stating that “traditional Property 
rights entail significant concurrent obligations or responsibilities imposed on the proprietary 
owner as an incident of their Property ownership”); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and the 
Information Ecosystem, 2005 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 6 (2005) (“Although people tend to focus 
on the absolute nature of property—the right to exclude in particular—real property law 
contains many limitations, safeguards, and obligations, such as adverse possessions, eminent 
domain, easements, servitudes, nuisance, zoning, irrevocable licenses, the Rule Against 
Perpetuities, and the waste and public trust doctrines.”). 
 51. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 15, at 223–25 (discussing the 
compatibility between the Chinese culture and Western intellectual property notions); Yu, 
Piracy, Prejudice, and Perspectives, supra note 33, at 76–77 (same).  Compare XIANFA art. 20 
(1982) (“The state promotes the development of the natural and social sciences, disseminates 
knowledge of science and technology, and commends and rewards achievements in scientific 
research as well as technological innovations and inventions.”), and id. art. 47 (“The state 
encourages and assists creative endeavors conducive to the interests of the people that are 
made by citizens engaged in education, science, technology, literature, art and other cultural 
work.”), with U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 (“The Congress shall have Power . . . to promote the 
Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors 
the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”). 
 52. See Charles R. Stone, Comment, What Plagiarism Was Not: Some Preliminary 
Observations on Classical Chinese Attitudes Toward What the West Calls Intellectual Property, 
92 MARQ. L. REV. 199, 199–200 (2008) (“Chinese scholars continue to aver that China 
invented at least one kind of protection—copyright—over six hundred years earlier.  They 
also disagree upon the factors that led to the recognition of intellectual property.” (footnote 
omitted)).  Professor Alford did acknowledge the existence of this line of scholarship.  
Nevertheless, he contended that their enquiries to date “treat[ed] imperial efforts to control 
the dissemination of ideas as constituting copyright” and ended there.  ALFORD, supra note 
33, at 18. 
 53. See, e.g., ALFORD, supra note 33, at 1 (considering “why intellectual property law, 
and in particular copyright, has never taken hold in China”); id. at 2 (noting that “imperial 
China did not develop a sustained indigenous counterpart to intellectual property law, in 
significant measure because of the character of Chinese political culture”). 
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intellectual property law reforms.  Thus, if reforms are introduced—
either internally through the borrowing of foreign ideas or externally in 
response to foreign pressure and coercive trade policies—such reforms 
may help China establish an exogenously developed intellectual 
property system. 
In fact, legal transplants from abroad and coercive trade pressure 
from the United States were the primary means by which the new 
intellectual property regime was established in China.54  It is therefore 
no surprise that foreign legal transplants were also a key focus of 
Professor Alford’s book.55  Although the level of overall intellectual 
property protection in China has yet to satisfy the United States 
government and its rights holders, improvements in such protection had 
been quite significant in the past two decades. 
When we go beyond the discussion of Confucianism to locate Asian 
values, the task becomes even more challenging.  Regardless of whether 
we embrace the strong or weak form of Professor Alford’s claim, we 
have to think seriously about whether it actually makes sense to 
generalize the Confucianism debate to cover other Asian cultures.  
There are several reasons. 
First, as pointed out earlier, Confucianism only forms the cultural 
basis of a small number of countries in East Asia.  Islam, for example, is 
important to countries like Indonesia, Malaysia, and Pakistan.  
Hinduism is very important to South Asia, covering places such as 
Bangladesh, India, and Nepal.  Buddhism is also very important to 
Southeast Asian countries, such as Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, 
Thailand, and Sri Lanka.  Indeed, as David Kang observed, “[t]he states 
of Southeast Asia experienced twin cultural influences, from India and 
from China.”56 
Even in China, Confucianism is only one of the three dominant 
philosophies in traditional Chinese society; Buddhism and Daoism had 
and continue to have very significant influence.57  As one commentator 
 
 54. See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 15, at 185–88 (discussing the establishment of the 
intellectual property regime in China in the 1980s and 1990s as a result of external pressure). 
 55. See ALFORD, supra note 33, at 30–55 (discussing foreign transplants in the 
intellectual property area and how the Chinese “learn[ed] the law at gunpoint”). 
 56. DAVID C. KANG, EAST ASIA BEFORE THE WEST: FIVE CENTURIES OF TRADE 
AND TRIBUTE 52 (2010); see also BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 
24, at 49 (“Evidence of the influence of other cultures on Southeast Asia can be seen from the 
extensive impact of Hinduism and Buddhism, although the historical record of the region’s 
early development is sketchy and imperfect.”); GEORGE COEDES, THE INDIANIZED STATES 
OF SOUTHEAST ASIA (1996) (tracing India’s influence on Southeast Asian culture). 
 57. See ALBERT H.Y. CHEN, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE LEGAL SYSTEM OF THE 
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observed, “[t]he bulk of early book publishing in China was in fact 
inspired by Buddhism, not Confucianism, and was directed at the 
acquisition of religious merit that appears to have been unrelated, and 
was perhaps even antithetical, to what we today would consider a 
property right.”58  Also present in the Chinese territory are many 
 
PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 11 (3d ed. 2004) (noting that, along with Confucianism, 
“Taoism and Buddhism were also influential in some periods and in some aspects of life”); 
ARTHUR F. WRIGHT, BUDDHISM IN CHINESE HISTORY 70–85 (1979) (discussing the 
importance of Buddhism and Daoism in Chinese history); Stone, supra note 52, at 226 (noting 
that “Buddhism and Daoism became quite influential in their own right”); Christoph Antons, 
Legal Culture and History of Law in Asia, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN ASIA 13, 
22–23 (Christopher Heath ed., 2003) (noting the importance of Confucianism, Taoism, 
Buddhism, and Legalism in China); Rollie Lal, China’s Relations with South Asia, in CHINA 
AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 7, at 133, 133 (“China has a long history of 
relations with India, beginning with cultural and religious contact between the two by 100 CE.  
Buddhism traveled from India through the Silk Route in Central Asia to China, mixing with 
the existing Daoist and Confucian philosophies there.”). 
 58. Stone, supra note 52, at 202.  As he elaborated: 
Although there is no doubt that Confucianism in its various incarnations played a 
central role in the development of printing and the dissemination of classical texts 
that, in turn, contributed to the eventual development of Chinese intellectual 
property, it is probably a mistake to focus all of our attention upon Confucianism in 
the first place. 
 It was not for two or three hundred years after the invention of printing that the 
Confucian classics appeared in print.  Chinese historians also note that as early as 
the turn of the seventh century, Buddhist scriptures reproduced among the populace 
outnumbered the Confucian classics by thousands of times.  The world’s earliest 
extant complete book on paper is probably the Buddhist text Parable Sutra (256).  
The earliest extant printed text is a Buddhist dharani sutra scroll (c. 704–751) 
discovered in a temple in Korea in 1966; it was probably printed in China.  The first 
complete printed book is probably the Buddhist Diamond Sutra (868) discovered by 
Aurel Stein in Dunhuang during his second expedition of 1907.  And when 
commercial printing arose in the tenth century, the output was unprecedented: 
“nearly half a million copies of Buddhist books and pictures are known to have been 
printed in the eastern part of China in one small area alone over a period of less 
than half a century.” 
 It is thus no secret that Buddhism is inseparable from the earliest book copying, 
production, and printing in China.  The reproduction of religious texts is uniquely 
appealing to Buddhists because it is a tenet of that religion that the copying and 
distribution of its sutras is a way to receive the blessings of its founder.  The Buddha, 
it is said, once remarked, “Whoever wishes to gain power from the dharani [charms] 
must write seventy-seven copies and place them in a pagoda.”  The underlying 
“religious motivation is . . . confirmed by the earliest printings of the dharani 
discovered in Japan and Korea.”  Furthermore, because Buddhism ideally required 
the “austere ideal of renunciation of the world of things,” it is not a philosophy that 
would naturally be expected to place much value on the concept of “owning” rights 
to printed texts, especially when these texts were religious and produced for pious 
motives.  Indeed, the concept of “property” is something that Buddhism is unlikely 
to celebrate, as the material world is itself “a deception, a dream from which we 
must awaken sooner or later.”  In other words, Buddhism is not only inextricably 
NEW YU- FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  6:56 PM 
2012]     INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ASIAN VALUES 347 
 
minority cultures and beliefs, including the Zhuang, Hui, Uygur, Yi, 
Tibetan, Miao, Manchu, Mongol, and Buyei.59 
Second, even if we focus only on Confucianism, that philosophy 
continues to evolve.  What we find in Confucianism today is actually 
quite different from the teachings of Confucius.60  From the Analects to 
Neo-Confucianism propounded by Zhu Xi (1130–1200) to the living 
principles used in modern Asian societies,61 Confucian teachings have 
undergone many significant transformations.  There are also many 
 
related to all aspects of China’s earliest book production, reproductions of its texts 
were initially made in vastly greater numbers than the Confucian classics, and its 
underlying philosophy seems uniquely ill-suited to the creation of what we in the 
West might consider a property right. 
Id. at 227–29 (footnotes omitted).  For early texts on Buddhism and Daoism, see generally 
Lucille Chia, The Uses of Print in Early Quanzhen Daoist Texts, in KNOWLEDGE AND TEXT 
PRODUCTION IN AN AGE OF PRINT: CHINA, 900–1400, at 167 (Lucille Chia & Hilde De 
Weerdt eds., 2011) [hereinafter KNOWLEDGE AND TEXT PRODUCTION]; Susan Shih-shan 
Huang, Early Buddhist Illustrated Prints in Hangzhou, in KNOWLEDGE AND TEXT 
PRODUCTION, supra, at 135. 
 59. See JAMES C.F. WANG, CONTEMPORARY CHINESE POLITICS: AN INTRODUCTION 
176 (6th ed. 1999) (“The largest of the fifty-six minority groups are the Zhuangs (15.4 
million), Hui or Chinese Muslims (8.6 million), Uygur (7.2 million), Yi (6.5 million), Tibetans 
(4.5 million), Miao (7.3 million), Manchus (9.8 million), Mongols (4.8 million). Bouyei (2.1 
million), and Koreans (1.9 million).”). 
 60. As William Theodore De Bary wrote: 
[When questioned “What does Confucianism have to offer today?”] I am . . . obliged 
to ask: “[w]hose Confucianism are we talking about?”  If it is the original teachings 
of Confucius in the Analects, then almost nothing said about Confucianism today 
speaks to that.  Indeed even the anti-Confucian diatribes earlier in [the twentieth] 
century spoke rarely to Confucius’ own views but only to later adaptations or 
distortions of them. 
WM. THEODORE DE BARY, THE TROUBLE WITH CONFUCIANISM xi (1991); see also DE 
BARY, ASIAN VALUES, supra note 26, at 11 (“Problems of continuity and change in the 
evolution of major traditions must be considered.  Confucianism should not be thought either 
static or monolithic—that is, taking the sayings of Confucius and Mencius just by themselves, 
to represent an historically developing, often conflicted, and yet gradually maturing 
Confucian tradition.”); Liu Shu-hsien, Confucian Ideals and the Real World: A Critical Review 
of Contemporary Neo-Confucian Thought, in CONFUCIAN TRADITIONS IN EAST ASIAN 
MODERNITY: MORAL EDUCATION AND ECONOMIC CULTURE IN JAPAN AND THE FOUR 
MINI-DRAGONS 92, 92 (Tu Wei-Ming ed., 1996) (noting that the term “Confucianism” “may 
refer to the philosophical tradition represented by Confucius and Mencius, or it may refer to 
the institutions and customs that emerged in the long course of Chinese history through the 
influence of Confucian thought”); Benjamin Schwartz, Some Polarities in Confucian Thought, 
in CONFUCIANISM AND CHINESE CIVILIZATION 3, 3 (Arthur F. Wright ed., 1964) 
(considering “universal and perennial” questions concerning whether “the original teachings 
of the founders [of Confucianism] can be extricated from the interpretations of the 
followers”). 
 61. See generally T.R. REID, CONFUCIUS LIVES NEXT DOOR: WHAT LIVING IN THE 
EAST TEACHES US ABOUT LIVING IN THE WEST (2000) (discussing the Confucian principles 
in modern Asian societies). 
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different strands of Confucianism.  As noted Confucian scholar 
Theodore de Bary observed, a strong liberal tradition existed in at least 
one strand of Confucianism, even though Confucianism is generally not 
publicly identified with liberal theories.62  Likewise, Professor Alford 
reminded us that “approaches rooted in portrayals of culture as 
essentially impervious to change, whether from within or beyond the 
society being examined,” run the risk of being unidimensional.63 
Furthermore, those Asian countries that adopt Confucianism 
embrace it for different reasons and to very different extents.  As 
Professor Kang recently noted: 
the main secondary states of East Asia chose Confucianism and 
Chinese ideas more for their own reasons than from Chinese 
pressure.  In Korea, Vietnam, and Japan, the debate about how 
to organize government and society occurred between warriors 
and scholars, with the Confucian literati winning in Korea and 
Vietnam and the warriors ultimately winning in Japan.  Although 
Chinese ideas were deeply embedded from the founding of these 
states, just as significantly, Chinese ideas were grafted onto what 
indigenous cultures, and the two coexisted—sometimes 
uncomfortably—resulting in only partial Sinicization.64 
Third, by focusing on the discrete values in Asia—whether as Asian 
values or simply as “values in Asia”65—the “Asian values” debate 
“underestimates both the historical ruptures of colonization and the 
present forces of global interaction.”66  In Michael Davis’ view, “cultural 
 
 62. See, e.g., DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES, supra note 26, at 108–09 (discussing how 
freedom of expression and association is recognized in “a significant line of Confucian 
thought”); WM. THEODORE DE BARY, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN CHINA (1983) (deriving 
the liberal tradition in Confucianism from writings of neo-Confucianist thinkers). 
 63. ALFORD, supra note 33, at 6. 
 64. KANG, supra note 56, at 26; see also LUCIAN W. PYE WITH MARY W. PYE, ASIAN 
POWER AND POLITICS: THE CULTURAL DIMENSIONS OF AUTHORITY 55 (1985) (“The East 
Asian countries of China, Japan, and Korea—and also Vietnam in Southeast Asia—all 
absorbed and refined Confucian values and concepts of authority.  But because of their 
individual cultural traditions, they also had their separate versions of Confucianism, which 
increasingly diverged as each country followed a different path to political modernization.”). 
 65. See BELL, BEYOND LIBERAL DEMOCRACY, supra note 26, at 54 (noting that the 
use of the term “values in Asia” “is sensitive to the pluralism of values within Asia yet retains 
the implication that such values can pose challenges to Western liberal approaches to human 
rights”); Peerenboom, supra note 22, at 7 (noting such a possible distinction in the human 
rights context but observing the many problems that will arise even with the use of the term 
“values in Asia”). 
 66. Tay, supra note 23, at 747; see also BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, 
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relativist theories . . . are tautological and overly deterministic because 
they fail to appreciate the roles of both human agency and institutions in 
the transformative processes of cultural discourse.”67  The “Asian 
values” debate also ignores the fact that “there are different views of 
human rights voiced in Asia, by opposition politicians, scholars, and 
non-government organizations.”68 
A case in point is the Bangkok Non-Governmental Organizations 
Declaration of March 27, 1993,69 which contrasted significantly with the 
Bangkok Declaration—to be more precise, the Bangkok Governmental 
Declaration.  As Simon Tay reminded us: 
[t]he N.G.O. Declaration differs significantly both from the 
Bangkok Declaration by governments and what . . . has, for 
convenience, termed the “Asian view”.  Th[is] Declaration 
places a stronger emphasis on civil and political rights than does 
the Declaration by government representatives.  It calls for 
democracy to be “fostered and guaranteed in all countries” and 
for Asian governments to “lift constraints on political rights . . . 
by repealing repressive laws . . . and liberalising the political 
system.”  Like the Bangkok Declaration by the Asian 
governments, it calls for cultural rights to be recognized on the 
basis that “[t]here is emerging a new understanding of 
universalism encompassing the richness and wisdom of Asia-
Pacific cultures”.  The N.G.O. Declaration explicitly stipulates, 
however, that “cultural practices which derogate from 
universally accepted human rights . . . must not be tolerated.”70 
 
supra note 24, at 50 (“[T]he dominant patterns of relationships that existed before European 
imperialism transformed the region suggest that things could have developed differently.”).  
As Professor Kang recounted:  “The British colonized Hong Kong, the Malay peninsula, 
Australia and New Zealand, Burma, India, and deeply influenced Siam [now Thailand].  
France colonized much of Indochina, including Vietnam and Cambodia.  The Dutch took 
Indonesia, the Spanish (and then the United States) conquered the Philippines, and the 
Portuguese possessed Macao.”  KANG, supra note 56, at 160. 
 67. Davis, Constitutionalism and Political Culture, supra note 21, at 110. 
 68. Tay, supra note 23, at 747. 
 69. The Bangkok NGO Declaration was reprinted in HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 26, at 208. 
 70. Tay, supra note 23, at 747 (footnotes omitted); see also David Kelly, The Chinese 
Search for Freedom as a Universal Value, in ASIAN FREEDOMS: THE IDEA OF FREEDOM IN 
EAST AND SOUTHEAST ASIA 93, 114 (David Kelly & Anthony Reid eds., 1998) (“The 
Bangkok Declaration is seriously at fault . . . in excluding the kind of voices . . . from Liang 
Qichao to Bao Zunxin . . . in its account of freedom in Asia.  This is in itself the most minimal 
of lists, and says nothing about countries apart from China.”); Inoue Tatsuo, Liberal 
Democracy and Asian Orientalism, in THE EAST ASIAN CHALLENGE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS, 
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Indeed, the drafters of the Non-Governmental Declaration criticized 
the Governmental Declaration for “reflect[ing] the continued attempt 
by many Governments of the Asia-Pacific region to avoid their human 
rights obligations, to put the state before the people and to avoid 
acknowledging their obligations to account for their failures in the 
promotion and protection of human rights.”71 
Fourth, as important as the influence of Confucianism may be in 
East Asian countries—or for that matter, Islam in the Middle East—one 
has to wonder whether the discussion of these influences is just based on 
cultural stereotypes.72  Communitarian philosophies are not unique to 
the Chinese or the Muslims; they can be found in civilizations around 
the world.73  While most in Western societies would find it misleading or 
overly simplistic to attribute the massive unauthorized copying problem 
on the internet in their countries to the communitarian underpinnings of 
Judeo-Christianity, it is equally problematic to attribute piracy and 
counterfeiting in Asia to Asian cultures.  Simply put, it is just misleading 
and overly simplistic to describe piracy and counterfeiting as a cultural 
problem.74 
 
supra note 26, at 27, 29 (“[T]he concept of Asian values does not convey Asian voices in their 
full complexity and diversity, nor does it represent genuine Asian initiatives.  Rather, it 
depends on, or even abuses, the West-centric frameworks that it claims to overcome.”). 
 71. Nongovernmental Organizations’ Response to the Bangkok Declaration, reprinted 
in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, supra note 26, at 211; see also TAY, 
supra note 20, at 12 (“While perhaps having some merit, the Asian values argument was 
suspect because its spokesmen were often politicians or officials associated with more 
authoritarian governments and regimes.  It was suspected to be a relatively sophisticated 
argument to justify existing power structures.”). 
 72. Simon Tay made a similar observation.  See Tay, supra note 23, at 747 (“Critics [of 
the cultural argument] will say the Asian view tends to generalizations and stereotypes of 
what is ‘Asian.’”). 
 73. See REIN MÜLLERSON, HUMAN RIGHTS DIPLOMACY 87 (1997) (“The West has 
had its own communitarian phases of development and communitarian ideas and practices 
can still be found in some sectors of Western society. . . .  And currently, many people in the 
West are thinking of how to put some limits on individualism, which, while being necessary 
for human liberation and economic development, may become excessive and indeed 
constitute a threat for both liberty and economic development.”); Aryeh Neier, Asia’s 
Unacceptable Standard, FOREIGN POL’Y, Autumn 1993, at 42, 42 (“Hong Kong’s 
entrepreneurs, who have made that colony an outstanding economic success, are as 
individualistic as their Western counterparts.  And seminal figures in the development of the 
West’s rights-based traditions, such as John Locke and Thomas Jefferson, also had their 
communitarian sides.”). 
 74. See Peter K. Yu, Four Common Misconceptions About Copyright Piracy, 26 LOY. 
L.A. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 127, 131–34 (2003) (explaining why copyright piracy is not 
merely a cultural problem). 
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2. Economic Developments 
Like culture, the economic and technological developments in Asia 
have been highly diverse and uneven.75  As David Llewellyn reminded 
us in his recent book, Invisible Gold in Asia: 
The term “Asia” was originally a Western concept to describe 
the eastern part of the land mass of Eurasia separated from 
Europe by the Ural Mountains—or, as the ancient Greeks would 
have said, “everything east of Greece.”  It incorporates a number 
of regions and peoples from vastly varied civilisations.  It is likely 
that the peoples of ancient Asia themselves, such as the Chinese, 
 
 75. As Mark Beeson pointed out: 
In the Asia-Pacific, . . . there is a far greater range of potential members in terms of 
their respective levels of economic development and organization, political practices 
and structures of government, and even in their respective cultural traditions and 
backgrounds, something that reduces the ability to act in concert as a consequence.  
There are dramatic differences in the size of the economies of APEC’s members . . . 
before we even begin to think about the way such economies are organized at the 
political level or integrated into wider structures of international governance, 
development and security. 
BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 4, at 4.  Similarly, Yash Ghai 
noted: 
The economic and political systems in Asia show a remarkable diversity, ranging 
from semi-feudal kingdoms in Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, through military 
dictatorships in Burma and Cambodia, effectively one-party regimes in Singapore 
and Indonesia, communist regimes in China and Vietnam, ambiguous democracies 
in Malaysia and Sri Lanka, to well-established democracies like India.  There are 
similarly differences in their economic systems, ranging from tribal subsistence 
economies in parts of Indonesia through highly developed market economies of 
Singapore, Hong Kong and Taiwan and the mixed economy model of India, to the 
planned economies of China and Vietnam. 
Yash Ghai, Asian Perspectives on Human Rights, in HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL 
RELATIONS, supra note 26, at 54, 54–55; see also BEESON, REGIONALISM AND 
GLOBALIZATION, supra note 24, at xiv (“[I]f there is one observation that is always made 
about East Asia it is about its diversity.”); id. at 116 (“Heterogeneity may be the leitmotif of 
East Asia, but the diversity of political systems found in Southeast Asia makes generalization 
difficult, if not foolhardy.”); ASSAFA ENDESHAW, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ASIAN 
EMERGING ECONOMIES 3 (2010) (stating that “it is never easy to jumble all Asian nations 
together and establish their economic and technological needs and how they might resolve 
any attendant problems”); TAY, supra note 20, at 19 (“The region has no single, strong, and 
enduring history of unity and accepted commonality, whether in polity, culture, language, or 
religion.”); id. at 38 (“Any claim by one Asian country would be met with vehement denials 
from others.  Asia is a region that is not only diverse but divided by tensions and unsettled 
questions.”); Christoph Antons, Analyzing Asian Law: The Need for a General Concept, 13 
LAW IN CONTEXT 106 (1995) (discussing the challenges in analyzing Asian law in light of the 
diverse historical and sociological backgrounds); Christopher Heath, Intellectual Property 
Rights in Asia, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN ASIA, supra note 57, at 3, 5 (noting the 
lack of common cultures, religions, and colonial backgrounds in Asia). 
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Indians, Japanese, Persians and Arabs, did not conceive the idea 
of Asia because they did not view themselves collectively in the 
way Europeans did.76 
For analytical convenience, the United Nations Statistics Division 
divides Asia into five different macro sub-regions: (1) central Asia; (2) 
eastern Asia; (3) southern Asia; (4) south-eastern Asia; and (5) western 
Asia.  Table 1 lists the different countries included in the U.N. 
geoscheme.  Although the Statistics Division stated explicitly that “[t]he 
assignment of countries or areas to specific groupings is for statistical 
convenience and does not imply any assumption regarding political or 
other affiliation of countries or territories by the United Nations,”77 the 
classification makes salient the challenges in determining at the outset 
which countries are to be analyzed for the purposes of identifying pan-
Asian positions in intellectual property law and policy. 
  
 
 76. DAVID LLEWELLYN, INVISIBLE GOLD IN ASIA: CREATING WEALTH THROUGH 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY xiv-xv (2010); accord DE BARY, ASIAN VALUES, supra note 26, 
at 2 (“In historical fact, while the diverse cultures of Asia are each to some degree 
multicultural (that is, the product of long cultural interactions), there was, until modern times, 
no consciousness among them of a shared Asian identity . . . . Traditionally the distinct 
civilizations of Asia did not identify themselves with a common continental culture, whatever 
the religious bonds they may have shared with other Asian peoples.”); H. PATRICK GLENN, 
LEGAL TRADITIONS OF THE WORLD: SUSTAINABLE DIVERSITY IN LAW 303 (3d ed. 2007) 
(“Asia may exist more in western thinking than in Asian, and the diversity of Asia is perhaps 
greater today than it ever has been.”). 
 77. Standard Country or Area Codes for Statistical Use, U.N. STATISTICS DIV., 
http://unstats.un.org/unsd/methods/m49/m49.htm (last revised Feb. 17, 2011). 
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 78. Id. 
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Even if we limit our discussion to only eastern, southern, and south-
eastern Asia—or even the West-centric Far East—it remains difficult to 
compare the economic developments in countries in these different sub-
regions.  Out of all the countries, Japan has the strongest and most 
sophisticated economy.  In Mark Besson’s view, this country is 
“especially important as an exemplar of a highly successful Asian 
state.”79 
Although China has recently overtaken Japan to become the world’s 
second largest economy on an aggregate basis, behind only the United 
States,80 Japan still dominates China dramatically on a per capita basis.  
With a per capita GDP of 39,738 in 2009, Japan is one of the richest 
developed countries.81  In the same period, China, by contrast, has a per 
capita GDP of only 3,744.  It therefore should still be classified as a low-
to-middle-income developing country.82  Indeed, China’s per capita 
GDP is lower than that of Malaysia and Thailand, not to mention Japan, 
Singapore, and South Korea.83 
In the area of intellectual property protection, Japan has improved 
considerably in the last two decades.  In the early 1980s, Japan was 
widely criticized for its limited intellectual property protection, due 
largely to the United States’ trade deficit with Japan.84  By the time the 
Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights85 
(“TRIPS Agreement”) was negotiated, Japan slowly assumed the role 
of a key trilateral partner with the United States and the European 
Communities—thanks in no small part to the push by local and foreign 
intellectual property industries.86  Most recently, Japan was instrumental 
 
 79. BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 24, at 106. 
 80. See David Barboza, China Passes Japan as Second-Largest Economy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Aug. 15, 2010, at B1. 
 81. GDP Per Capita (Current US$), WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GDP.PCAP.CD (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) 
[hereinafter GDP Per Capita]. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See MICHAEL P. RYAN, PLAYING BY THE RULES: AMERICAN TRADE POWER 
AND DIPLOMACY IN THE PACIFIC 16–17 (1995) (providing a list of Section 301 trade disputes 
involving Japan from 1974 to 1989); JAYASHREE WATAL, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS IN THE WTO AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 24 (2001) (stating that Japan was 
identified as a priority foreign country under the Super 301 process for providing inadequate 
market access to U.S. goods and services). 
 85. Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, Apr. 15, 
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 1C, 108 Stat. 
4809, 1869 U.N.T.S. 299 (1994) [hereinafter TRIPS Agreement]. 
 86. See generally DUNCAN MATTHEWS, GLOBALISING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
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in driving the negotiation of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(“ACTA”),87 a voluntary plurilateral agreement that aims to set a new 
and higher benchmark for international intellectual property protection 
and enforcement among like-minded countries.88 
Unlike Japan, China arrived much later in both the economic and 
intellectual property scenes; it is the “new kid on the block” of the 
World Trade Organization (“WTO”).89  Nevertheless, it now has 
successfully established itself as a dominant Asian economic power.  
Today, China is the world’s largest exporter and second largest 
economy and trading nation.90  It is also one of the world’s largest 
recipients of foreign direct investment (“FDI”) with capital inflows of 
about $50 billion, behind only the United States and the United 
Kingdom.91  Its factories “make 70 percent of the world’s toys, 60 
percent of its bicycles, half its shoes, and one-third of its luggage. . . . 
[China also] builds half of the world’s microwave ovens, one-third of its 
television sets and air conditioners, a quarter of its washers, and one-
fifth of its refrigerators.”92 
Given China’s geopolitical importance and its immense growth 
potential, some commentators have linked China to the United States, 
creating what they have called the G-2 (Group of 2).93  As they argued, 
G-2 is likely to be crucial to discussions on global matters, which range 
from economic recovery to climate change.  Some economists and 
commentators also highlighted the growing economic interdependence 
 
RIGHTS: THE TRIPS AGREEMENT 66 (2002) (examining the role of the industries in the 
TRIPS negotiations); SUSAN K. SELL, PRIVATE POWER, PUBLIC LAW 96–120 (2003) (same). 
 87. Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement, opened for signature May 1, 2011, available 
at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2011/may/tradoc_147937.pdf [hereinafter ACTA]. 
 88. See generally Peter K. Yu, ACTA and Its Complex Politics, 3 WIPO J. 1 (2011) 
(criticizing the use of the “country club” approach to negotiate ACTA); Peter K. Yu, Six 
Secret (and Now Open) Fears of ACTA, 64 SMU L. REV. 975 (2011) [hereinafter Yu, Six 
Secret Fears] (discussing the serious concerns about ACTA). 
 89. Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 352. 
 90. C. FRED BERGSTEN ET AL., CHINA’S RISE: CHALLENGES AND OPPORTUNITIES 9 
(2009). 
 91. Daniel Chow, The Role of Intellectual Property in Promoting International Trade 
and Foreign Direct Investment, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION 
WEALTH: ISSUES AND PRACTICES IN THE DIGITAL AGE 187, 198 (Peter K. Yu ed., 2007) 
[hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION WEALTH]. 
 92. SHENKAR, supra note 4, at 2–3. 
 93. Compare BERGSTEN ET AL., supra note 90, at 25 (noting the need for China and 
the United States to “develop a very informal but increasingly effective ‘G-2’ . . . to help 
guide the global governance process on an increasing number of economic topics”), with 
HALPER, supra note 9, at 216–18 (arguing against the elevation of the U.S.-China relations to 
the bilateral status of a special G2 relationship). 
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between China and the United States by alluding to “a chain-gang 
relationship” between the two countries,94 or what Niall Ferguson and 
Moritz Schularick have described as “Chimerica.”95 
In the intellectual property area, China’s developments have also 
been quite impressive, especially in major cities and coastal areas.96  
Today, China is among the top 5 countries filing patent applications 
through the Patent Cooperation Treaty (“PCT”) under the auspices of 
the World Intellectual Property Organization (“WIPO”).97  In 2010, the 
number of PCT applications increased by 56.2% to 12,337, moving 
China to the fourth spot, behind only the United States, Japan, and 
Germany.98 
Since 1994, the Chinese Patent Office, which later became the State 
Intellectual Property Office (“SIPO”), has also been recognized as an 
international searching authority for PCT purposes.99  In Peter Drahos’ 
view, such recognition made China “a player in the top tier of patent 
offices that will dominate the emerging system of global patent 
administration.”100  It is therefore no surprise that, in 2007, SIPO met 
with the European Patent Office, the Japanese Patent Office, the 
Korean Intellectual Property Office (“KIPO”), and the United States 
Patent and Trademark Office to discuss ways to “improv[e] the 
efficiency of their examination systems and to harmonize their office 
 
 94. Walden Bello, Chain-Gang Economics: China, the US, and the Global Economy, in 
CHINA’S NEW ROLE, supra note 7, at 7, 11; see also HALPER, supra note 9, at 25 (“[T]he 
American and Chinese economies are heavily interdependent.  America has grown addicted 
to Chinese credit; China has grown equally addicted to American consumption.  The depth of 
this interdependence creates a relationship that is stabilized in a kind of economic version of 
mutually assured destruction.”); ZACHARY KARABELL, SUPERFUSION: HOW CHINA AND 
AMERICA BECAME ONE ECONOMY AND WHY THE WORLD’S PROSPERITY DEPENDS ON IT 
(2009) (discussing the intertwined economic relationship between China and the United 
States); Peter K. Yu, Remember that China, U.S. Need Each Other, DES MOINES REG., Feb. 
22, 2009, at 4OP [hereinafter Yu, China, U.S. Need Each Other] (noting this “chain-gang 
relationship”). 
 95. Niall Ferguson & Moritz Schularick, ‘Chimerica’ and the Global Asset Market 
Boom, 10 INT’L FIN. 215 (2007). 
 96. See Yu, China Puzzle, supra note 15, at 185–88 (tracing the development of the 
intellectual property regime in China); Yu, From Pirates to Partners II, supra note 15, at 975–
99 (examining the progress China has made in the intellectual property arena). 
 97. Press Release, World Intellectual Prop. Org. [WIPO], International Patent Filings 
Recover in 2010, http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2011/article_0004.html (Feb. 9, 
2011). 
 98. Id.  The 2010 figures for the United States, Japan, and Germany were 44,855, 
32,156, and 17,171, respectively. 
 99. PETER DRAHOS, THE GLOBAL GOVERNANCE OF KNOWLEDGE: PATENT OFFICES 
AND THEIR CLIENTS 233 (2010). 
 100. Id. 
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systems.”101 
While piracy and counterfeiting problems remain, China has begun 
to make a pro-active move from the imitation model to a new 
innovation model.102  The State Council’s recently adopted National 
Intellectual Property Strategy, for example, seeks to strengthen the 
country’s indigenous and innovative capacities.103  The strategy strongly 
indicates the leaders’ growing understanding of the important role 
intellectual property protection and enforcement play in driving a 
country’s economy.104 
Like China, India has very impressive economic and technological 
developments.  Thus far, this other BRICS country has yet to compete 
effectively against China, in part due to the problems with its poor 
infrastructure, bureaucratic red tape, and failure to attract a substantial 
amount of FDI.105  However, India, which already has the world’s second 
largest population, is catching up fast and possesses strengths that China 
may not have—for example, a younger workforce with a good command 
of English, higher population growth, superior capital efficiency, strong 
investment growth potential, and entrepreneurship.106  Some 
 
 101. Id. at 236. 
 102. See generally LI YAHONG, IMITATION TO INNOVATION IN CHINA: THE ROLE OF 
PATENTS IN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND PHARMACEUTICAL INDUSTRIES (2010) (discussing 
China’s move from an imitation model to an innovation model). 
 103. See STATE COUNCIL, OUTLINE OF THE NATIONAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
STRATEGY (2008), available at http://www.gov.cn/english/2008-06/21/content_1023471.htm. 
 104. See Peter K. Yu, The TRIPS Enforcement Dispute, 89 NEB. L. REV. 1046, 1123 
(2011) (considering it highly encouraging that China now understands the importance of 
domestic innovation); see also Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 15, at 189–96 (noting 
the need to convince Chinese leaders why intellectual property protection will benefit China). 
 105. See Pete Engardio, Introduction to CHINDIA: HOW CHINA AND INDIA ARE 
REVOLUTIONIZING GLOBAL BUSINESS 27 (Pete Engardio ed., 2006) [hereinafter 
CHINDIA] (noting “India’s decrepit infrastructure [and] bureaucratic red tape”); The Rise of 
India, in CHINDIA, supra, at 45, 49 (“[C]ompared to China with its modern infrastructure 
and disciplined workforce, India is far behind in exports and as a magnet for foreign 
investment.”); see also ROBYN MEREDITH, THE ELEPHANT AND THE DRAGON: THE RISE 
OF INDIA AND CHINA AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR ALL OF US 57 (2007) (“China is winning 
the sprint, and [India is] going to win the marathon.” (quoting Kamal Nath, India’s minister 
of commerce and industry)).  But see id. at 154 (“China has proved so much more efficient 
than India at development and managing its economy that th[e] scenario [that India’s 
economy will overtake China’s] is unlikely unless China falls into political turmoil.”). 
 106. See Why India May Be Destined to Overtake China, in CHINDIA, supra note 105, 
at 27 (discussing India’s strengths vis-à-vis China); The Rise of India, supra note 105, at 50 
(noting the “deep source of low-cost, high-IQ, English-speaking brainpower [that] may soon 
have a more far-reaching impact on the U.S. than China”).  As one commentator observed 
interestingly: 
Chinese analysts argue that because India’s salaries are lower, costs are 
cheaper, thereby making Indian products more competitive.  Language is also a 
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commentators even predicted that India will overtake China 
economically in the second half of this century.107 
Within the intellectual property area, India has also garnered 
significant attention.  The strength of its software industry speaks for 
itself.108  Its generic pharmaceutical industry, which features such 
companies as Ranbaxy and Dr. Reddy’s Laboratories, is also considered 
one of the most important and sophisticated in the world.109  Because 
India “makes more than a fifth of the world’s generic drugs”110 and 
eighty-five percent of generic HIV/AIDS antiretrovirals in Sub-Saharan 
Africa,111 commentators have noted the significant impact a reduced 
supply of Indian generic drugs will have on the global access to essential 
medicines in the less developed world.112 
In December 2007, India finally joined China, Japan, and South 
Korea in having its patent office designated as an international 
searching authority.113  As of this writing, India has yet to conclude an 
 
factor.  Chinese businessmen fear that U.S. businesses will prefer Indian 
products because of the Indian facility with English.  In a strange turn of events, 
the Chinese population is now asking whether their market is likely to be 
flooded with cheap Indian goods. 
Lal, supra note 57, at 141. 
 107. See, e.g., The Rise of Chindia, in CHINDIA, supra note 105, at 13, 14 (“Until now, 
China has attained dramatically higher growth.  But some experts believe India’s superior 
capital efficiency, higher population growth, and younger workforce mean growth is more 
sustainable and will enable India to surpass China in economic growth in the coming 
decades.”); Why India May Be Destined to Overtake China, supra note 106, at 27 (discussing 
the different factors that may enable India to surpass China). 
 108. See generally Suma S. Athreye, The Indian Software Industry, in FROM 
UNDERDOGS TO TIGERS: THE RISE AND GROWTH OF THE SOFTWARE INDUSTRY IN 
BRAZIL, CHINA, INDIA, IRELAND, AND ISRAEL 7–40 (Ashish Arora & Alfonso Gambardella 
eds., 2006) (discussing the rise and growth of the Indian software industry). 
 109. See generally SUDIP CHAUDHURI, THE WTO AND INDIA’S PHARMACEUTICALS 
INDUSTRY: PATENT PROTECTION, TRIPS, AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 180–221 (2005) 
(discussing the growth and prospects of generic drug exports from India). 
 110. KAMAL NATH, INDIA’S CENTURY 110 (2008). 
 111. Colleen Chien, HIV/AIDS Drugs for Sub-Saharan Africa: How Do Brand and 
Generic Supply Compare?, 2 PLOS ONE e278 (2007), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1009287. 
 112. See, e.g., Kenneth C. Shadlen, Is AIDS Treatment Sustainable?, in THE GLOBAL 
GOVERNANCE OF HIV/AIDS: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ACCESS TO ESSENTIAL 
MEDICINES (Obijiofor Aginam, John Harrington & Peter K. Yu eds., forthcoming 2012) 
(“[I]t is estimated that more than half of those receiving AIDS treatment in the developing 
world are treated with generic [antiretrovirals] produced in India.”); Yu, Access to Medicines, 
supra note 6, at 388–89 (noting that the picture “may change as generic manufacturers in the 
BRICS countries, such as those in India, become more active in developing on-patent drugs, 
partly as a result of the TRIPs Agreement”).  
 113. Press Release, Ministry of Commerce & Industry, India Recognised as 
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agreement with the International Bureau of WIPO.  In the future, India 
is likely to join China, Japan, and South Korea to become countries with 
a large volume of PCT applications. 
If these accomplishments are not enough, India, along with Brazil, 
has been the undisputed leader of the developing world in international 
intellectual property discussions.114  For example, before the adoption of 
the TRIPS Agreement, India demanded the revision of both the Berne 
Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works115 and the 
Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property,116 the two 
leading international intellectual property conventions.117  The goodwill 
and leadership they developed in this early period continue even today.  
Although it remains unclear whether “India and Brazil are prepared to 
provide the general leadership on intellectual property issues that they 
once did,”118 India is likely to continue to feature prominently in 
regional and international intellectual property debates.119 
Outside these three powerful Asian economies, Hong Kong, 
Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan are in a league of their own.  
Commentators have described these countries and regions as newly 
industrialized economies, the “four little dragons,” or the “four Asian 
tigers.”120  Consider South Korea, for example.  The country already has 
a highly successful home electronics industry that produces many 
innovative products; Samsung remains a household name in the West.  
In 2007, “Korea ranked fourth in the . . . International Patent 
Applications statistics, occupying 4.47% of global patents. . . .  Korea 
 
International Searching Authority and International Preliminary Examining Authority, 
http://pib.nic.in/newsite/erelease.aspx?relid=34113 (Dec. 18, 2007). 
 114. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 350–51 (discussing India’s historical 
role as a leader in the less developed world and its active lobbying on behalf of these 
countries for lower intellectual property protection and special and differential treatment). 
 115. Berne Convention for the Protection of Literary and Artistic Works, Sept. 9, 1886, 
828 U.N.T.S. 221 (revised at Paris July 24, 1971). 
 116. Paris Convention for the Protection of Industrial Property, Mar. 20, 1883, 21 
U.S.T. 1583, 828 U.N.T.S. 305 (revised at Stockholm July 14, 1967). 
 117. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 351 (discussing India’s demands for 
special concessions in the international copyright and patent systems). 
 118. Peter Drahos, Developing Countries and International Intellectual Property 
Standard-Setting, 5 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 765, 765 (2002) [hereinafter Drahos, Developing 
Countries]. 
 119. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 351 (“[M]any of [the BRICS] 
countries, like China and India, are still very eager to take up the role of regional power, if 
not a world power.  So, there is still a very good chance that their interests in geopolitics may 
spill over into the politics of intellectual property rights.”). 
 120. See, e.g., ALFORD, supra note 33, at 5; LLEWELLYN, supra note 76, at 137. 
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[also] had the highest number of resident patent applications filed per 
billion dollars of GDP and per million dollars of R&D expenditures.”121 
Moreover, KIPO has been very active in recent years.  With the 
Japanese Patent Office and China’s SIPO, KIPO formed the Asian 
Trilaterals, which regularly engage in policy dialogues among Asian 
patent offices.122  KIPO now “has superhighway arrangements in place 
with the Japanese Patent Office . . . and the [U.S. Patent and Trademark 
Office], and it is also moving into a superhighway arrangement with the 
Danish [Patent Office].”123  Most recently, South Korea completed a free 
trade agreement with the United States, which is pending Congressional 
approval.124  Included in the agreement is an extensive intellectual 
property chapter that seeks to align the country’s intellectual property 
standards with those of the United States.125 
Like South Korea, Singapore has entered into a free trade 
agreement with the United States.126  In fact, Singapore was one of the 
first Asian countries to enter into such a bilateral agreement.  
Singapore’s emphasis on the development of a knowledge-based 
economy is understandable.  Being a small, but highly urbanized127 city 
state that focuses primarily on foreign investment,128 exports of high-
 
 121. Ji-Hyun Park, South Korea, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ASIA: LAW, 
ECONOMICS, HISTORY AND POLITICS 259, 275 (Paul Goldstein & Joseph Straus eds., 2009) 
[hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ASIA] (footnote omitted).  See generally Keun 
Lee & Yee Kyoung Kim, IPR and Technological Catch-Up in Korea, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCH-UP: AN INTERNATIONAL COMPARATIVE 
STUDY 133 (Hiroyuki Odagiri et al. eds., 2010) [hereinafter INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCH-UP] (examining how South Korea caught up in the 
field of intellectual property and technological development). 
 122. DRAHOS, supra note 99, at 233. 
 123. Id. at 239 (footnote omitted). 
 124. Press Release, Office of the United States Trade Rep., Signed Legal Texts 
Related to U.S.-Korea Trade Agreement, http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/press-office/press-
releases/2011/february/signed-legal-texts-related-us-korea-trade-agreeme (Feb. 10, 2011). 
 125. Korea–United States Free Trade Agreement, S. Korea-U.S., ch. 18, May 6, 2003, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore FTA/Final 
Texts/asset upload file708 4036.pdf [hereinafter KORUS FTA]. 
 126. United States–Singapore Free Trade Agreement, U.S.-Sing., May 6, 2003, 
available at http://www.ustr.gov/assets/Trade Agreements/Bilateral/Singapore FTA/Final 
Texts/asset upload file708 4036.pdf [hereinafter USSFTA]. 
 127. See ASIAN DEV. BANK, ASIAN DEVELOPMENT OUTLOOK 2010 UPDATE: THE 
FUTURE OF GROWTH IN ASIA 71 (2010), available at 
http://www.adb.org/documents/books/ado/2010/update/ado2010-update.pdf (noting that 
“more than 80% of the population live in urban areas” in Hong Kong, Singapore, and South 
Korea). 
 128. See BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 24, at 165 (“The 
essence of the strategy the Singaporean government adopted was to make itself an attractive 
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technology products,129 and a reliance on service industries,130 intellectual 
property rights play a very important role in the country’s future 
economic development.  While Singapore has a high per capita GDP131 
and very high levels of intellectual property protection and 
enforcement, it is also a founding member of the ASEAN, a regional 
group that includes some of the weakest economies in Southeast Asia.  
If it continues to stay within the group and assumes greater leadership, 
it is likely to play a very important role in the development of 
intellectual property law and policy in Asia. 
Within ASEAN, the divergence in economic and technological 
developments is the most blatant.  While Singapore is no doubt the 
economic leader in the pack,132 Indonesia, the Philippines, and Vietnam 
are included in what the Goldman Sachs analysts have termed the N-11 
 
investment location for mobile international capital.”); LLEWELLYN, supra note 76, at 157 
(“Up to the late 1980s the principal driver for [Singapore’s] spectacular growth was foreign 
direct investment in manufacturing for companies based overseas, particularly in electronics, 
engineering, chemicals, and pharmaceuticals.”); Ng-Loy Wee Loon, Singapore, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ASIA, supra note 121, at 233, 235 (Paul Goldstein & Joseph 
Straus eds., 2009) (“The strategy [for Singapore] was to embark on an industrialization 
programme that was export-oriented.  Foreign investors were actively wooed to develop their 
manufacturing operations in Singapore for export to world markets—both in low-technology, 
labour-intensive industries (e.g., textile, garment, and toy factories were set up by Hong Kong 
and Taiwanese businesses) and in higher-technology industries.”); see also BEESON, 
REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 24, at 164 (“In Singapore’s case, its 
geographical location at the cross-roads of Asian trade and its historical role as a crucial 
entrepôt of the British empire meant that it was well placed to take advantage of the 
expanding world economy.”); Alban Kang, Singapore, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS 
OF EAST ASIA 323, 323 (Alan S. Gutterman & Robert Brown eds., 1997) (noting Singapore’s 
historical role as “a trading outpost for the British” during colonial times). 
 129. See High-Technology Exports (Current US$), WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/TX.VAL.TECH.CD (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) 
[hereinafter High-Technology Exports] (reporting that high-technology exports accounted for 
51% of exports manufactured in Singapore in 2008). 
 130. See Trade in Services (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/BG.GSR.NFSV.GD.ZS (last visited Apr. 10, 2011) 
(reporting that trade in services accounted for 95.1% of Singapore’s GDP in 2009); Ng-Loy, 
supra note 128, at 240 (“Singapore’s economic planning for the 1990s included strategies to 
promote the service sector together with manufacturing, to deepen the technology base, and 
to create an ‘external’ economy through globalization.  The idea behind the strategy to 
deepen the technology base in Singapore was to move Singapore up the value-chain in 
manufacturing, especially in emerging fields such as biotechnology, and to attract research 
and development (R&D) activities.”). 
 131. GDP Per Capita, supra note 81. 
 132. See Dean A. DeRosa, US Free Trade Agreements with ASEAN, in FREE TRADE 
AGREEMENTS: US STRATEGIES AND PRIORITIES 117, 163 (Jeffrey J. Schott ed., 2004) 
(“Singapore is economically the strongest AEAN country, but unlike its ASEAN partners it 
is not an agriculture-exporting country.”). 
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(Next Eleven) countries, along with other Asian economies such as 
Bangladesh, Iran, Pakistan, and South Korea.133  Like the BRICS 
countries, this group of large developing countries has the potential to 
pose considerable challenge to major developed economies.134  
Meanwhile, Cambodia, Laos, and Myanmar, the three new ASEAN 
members, remain least developed countries—similar to such other 
Asian neighbors as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, Nepal, and 
Timor-Leste.135  The ASEAN-China Free Trade Area (ACFTA), for 
example, will not be fully implemented in Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, 
Vietnam until 2015, five years after the full implementation in the 
ASEAN-6 countries (Brunei Darussalam, Indonesia, Malaysia, the 
Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand).136  The ASEAN members have 
also received benefits under the Early Harvest Program in ACFTA, 
which provides for the early opening of markets for specific goods and 
services in China.137 
In sum, there are significant differences over the economic and 
technological developments within Asia.  Table 2 further identifies the 
considerable variations in technological developments and innovation 
capabilities.  Because economic developments have heavily influenced 
the state of intellectual property protection and enforcement, the wide 
diversity of regional developments virtually guarantees the non-
existence of any established consensus on intellectual property law and 
 
 133. See Jim O’Neill et al., How Solid Are the BRICs? 7–8 (Goldman Sachs, Global 
Economics Paper No. 134, 2005) (advancing the concept of the N-11 countries in response to 
questions concerning whether there are more “BRICs” out there). 
 134. See id. at 7. 
 135. Landlocked Developing Countries and Small Island Developing States, Least 
Developed Countries—Country Profiles, U.N. OFFICE OF THE HIGH REP. FOR THE LEAST 
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, http://www.unohrlls.org/en/ldc/related/62/ (last visited Apr. 11, 
2011).  Laos and Myanmar joined ASEAN on July 23, 1997, while Cambodia joined on April 
30, 1999.  About ASEAN, ASEAN SECRETARIAT, http://www.aseansec.org/ 
about_ASEAN.html (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
 136. Dorothy-Grace Guerrero, China’s Rise and Increasing Role in Asia, in CHINA’S 
NEW ROLE, supra note 7, at 191, 193. 
 137. See Michael A. Glosny, Stabilizing the Backyard: Recent Developments in China’s 
Policy Toward Southeast Asia, in CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 7, at 
150, 173 (“Initiatives like the [ASEAN-China Free Trade Area] and Early Harvest Program 
. . . were designed to give ASEAN states a preferential opportunity to penetrate the China 
market.”); Guerrero, supra note 136, at 193 (“[The Early Harvest Program] grants three-year 
duty-free entry for ASEAN goods into the Chinese markets.  After this, China’s 
manufactured goods will have full free tariff access to Southeast Asian markets.”); Wang 
Jiangyu, Association of Southeast Asian Nations–China Free Trade Agreement, in BILATERAL 
AND REGIONAL TRADE AGREEMENTS: CASE STUDIES 192, 198 (Simon Lester & Bryan 
Mercurio eds., 2009) (discussing the Early Harvest Program in the ASEAN-China Free Trade 
Area). 
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policy in Asia.  Indeed, intellectual property developments vary 
significantly within Asia.  As Professor Llewellyn observed: 
Countries around Asia feature in every different category of IPR 
development: from the advanced relying on its own innovation 
and creativity (Japan), to those moving—at varying speeds—
from imitator to innovator (China, India, Taiwan and South 
Korea); those aiming to use in the development of their own 
Invisible Gold the technology and known-how introduced by 
foreign investors (Singapore, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand); 
to the newly industrialising countries . . . still highly dependent 
on foreign technology and assistance (Vietnam, Cambodia and 
Laos).138  
 
 138. LLEWELLYN, supra note 76, at 117. 
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 139. As the World Bank explained: 
GDP at purchaser’s prices is the sum of gross value added by all resident producers 
in the economy plus any product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the 
value of the products.  It is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of 
fabricated assets or for depletion and degradation of natural resources.  Data are in 
current U.S. dollars.  Dollar figures for GDP are converted from domestic 
currencies using single year official exchange rates.  For a few countries where the 
official exchange rate does not reflect the rate effectively applied to actual foreign 
exchange transactions, an alternative conversion factor is used. 
GDP (Current US$), WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/ 
indicator/NY.GDP.MKTP.CD (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
 140. As the World Bank explained: 
GDP per capita is gross domestic product divided by midyear population.  GDP is 
the sum of gross value added by all resident producers in the economy plus any 
product taxes and minus any subsidies not included in the value of the products.  It 
is calculated without making deductions for depreciation of fabricated assets or for 
depletion and degradation of natural resources.  Data are in current U.S. dollars. 
GDP Per Capita, supra note 81. 
 141. “Patent applications are worldwide patent applications filed through the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty procedure or with a national patent office for exclusive rights for an 
invention. . . .”  Patent Applications, Residents, WORLD BANK, http://data.worldbank.org/ 
indicator/IP.PAT.RESD (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
142. “Trademark applications filed are applications to register a trademark with a 
national or regional Intellectual Property . . . office. . . .  Direct resident trademark 
applications are those filed by domestic applicants directly at a given national IP office.”  
Trademark Applications, Direct Resident, WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.TMK.RESD (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
 143. “Expenditures for research and development are current and capital expenditures 
(both public and private) on creative work undertaken systematically to increase knowledge, 
including knowledge of humanity, culture, and society, and the use of knowledge for new 
applications.  R&D covers basic research, applied research, and experimental development.”  
Research and Development Expenditure (% of GDP), WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/GB.XPD.RSDV.GD.ZS (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
 144. “High-technology exports are products with high R&D intensity, such as in 
aerospace, computers, pharmaceuticals, scientific instruments, and electrical machinery.  
Data are in current U.S. dollars.”  High-Technology Exports, supra note 129. 
 145. “Researchers in R&D are professionals engaged in the conception or creation of 
new knowledge, products, processes, methods, or systems and in the management of the 
projects concerned.  Postgraduate PhD students . . . engaged in R&D are included.”  
Researchers in R&D (Per Million People), WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.POP.SCIE.RD.P6 (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
 146. “Scientific and technical journal articles refer to the number of scientific and 
engineering articles published in the following fields: physics, biology, chemistry, 
mathematics, clinical medicine, biomedical research, engineering and technology, and earth 
and space sciences.”  Scientific and Technical Journal Articles, WORLD BANK, 
http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/IP.JRN.ARTC.SC (last visited Apr. 10, 2011). 
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Japan 4,552,200 35,627 367,960 114,015 3.33 122,679 5,531 55,502 
China 2,256,902 1,731 93,485 593,382 1.33 214,245 853 41,604 
S. Korea 844,863 17,551 122,188 99,435 2.98 83,526 3,780 16,396 
India 837,195 765 4,521 73,308 0.80 3,382 137 14,635 
Indonesia 285,868 1,304 234 30,734 0.05 6,571 N/A 205 
Thailand 176,351 2,674 891 24,275 0.23 22,479 311 1,249 
Malaysia 137,848 5,378 522 10,479 N/A 57,650 N/A 615 
Singapore 125,417 29,401 569 5,067 2.30 105,077 5,575 3,611 
Philippines 98,823 1,156 210 7,050 0.12 25,997 81 178 
Vietnam 52,426 631 180 12,884 N/A 869 N/A 221 
Cambodia 6,454 465 N/A 464 N/A N/A N/A 21 
Laos 2,723 463 N/A N/A N/A N/A N/A 9 
Table 2: Indicators on Technological Developments and Innovation Capabilities in 
2005147 
 
3. Geopolitical Rivalries 
While culture does not provide the underlying intellectual property 
values, and the region’s highly uneven economic and technological 
developments have made it difficult to achieve a consensus, 
geographical rivalries—and the lack of a regional hegemon148—have 
made it difficult for Asia to develop unified positions on intellectual 
property law and policy.  Indeed, such rivalries continue to dominate 
 
 147. 2005 was selected to maximize the amount of data available for comparison 
purposes.  It is important to remember that, in the past few years, technological and 
innovation capabilities have increased dramatically in many fast-growing Asian countries 
such as China and India. 
 148. Regional hegemony is important because it gives countries the power to shape 
regional laws, policies, and developments according to its own interests.  Nevertheless, 
commentators remain skeptical that any Asian country can become a hegemon in the region.  
See KANG, supra note 56, at 171 (“Given the changes in the international system and the 
central place of the United States there is almost no chance that China will become the 
unquestioned hegemon in East Asia.”); see also Peter K. Yu, Sinic Trade Agreements, 44 U.C. 
DAVIS L. REV. 953, 1022 (2011) (noting that the development of a unified Asian position 
down the road is rather unlikely). 
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the interactions among countries within the region. 
Since the explosion of the Chinese economy, commentators have 
suggested a growing rivalry in Asia between China and Japan.149  This 
rivalry is not new; it dates back to at least the nineteenth century.  
Nevertheless, China was fairly weak in the twentieth century, following 
repeated attacks by imperialist powers.  Mao’s autarky, self-reliance, 
and import substitution policies also made China backward, leaving the 
country with limited foreign technology and capital while isolating it 
from the international community.150 
In recent years, however, the rivalries between China and Japan 
have become more apparent, thus raising concerns among their Asian 
neighbors.  A case in point is the disagreement between the two 
countries over the acceptable participants of the 2005 East Asian 
Summit.151  This disagreement foreshadowed the growing rivalry and a 
deepening conflict between China and Japan.  Other early signals of this 
rivalry include 
Beijing’s blockage of the possibility of Japan having a permanent 
seat on the UN Security Council; their competing claims to 
petroleum deposits and islands in the East China Sea; and 
China’s irritation at the visits of former Prime Minister Koizumi 
to the Yasukuni Shrine, where Japan’s war dead, 14 of whom are 
regarded as war criminals by China and South Korea, were 
buried.152 
Despite this rivalry, the ongoing push for initiatives under ASEAN+3 
(an ad hoc group that includes ASEAN, China, Japan and South 
Korea), ASEAN+6 (an ad hoc group that includes ASEAN+3, 
Australia, New Zealand, and India), and the proposed China–Japan–
South Korea free trade agreement seems to suggest that “China 
understands that the future of the region depends upon a constructive 
relationship between China and Japan.”153 
 
 149. For a discussion of China’s relations with Japan, see generally ROBERT G. 
SUTTER, CHINA’S RISE IN ASIA: PROMISES AND PERILS 125–50 (2005).  For a timely 
collection of essays on the implications of China’s rise for the balance of influence in Asia, see 
generally CHINA’S RISE AND THE BALANCE OF INFLUENCE IN ASIA (William W. Keller & 
Thomas G. Rawski eds., 2007) [hereinafter BALANCE OF INFLUENCE IN ASIA]. 
 150. See Yu, From Pirates to Partners, supra note 15, at 198. 
 151. See Guerrero, supra note 136, at 192 (“The rift in the first [East Asian Summit] 
was the tip of the iceberg that is the Sino-Japanese conflict.”). 
 152. Id. at 192. 
 153. Zhang Yunling & Tang Shiping, China’s Regional Strategy, in POWER SHIFT: 
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Regardless of whether China can work closely with Japan, the wide 
differences in economic and technological developments in the two 
countries will continue to make it difficult for them to reach a consensus 
over issues related to intellectual property law and policy.  It is one 
thing to have no major conflict between these two countries, but it is 
quite another thing to have the two countries coordinating their 
positions on intellectual property law and policy. 
India also plays a very important role in Asia’s future development.  
As Robert Kagan put it, “In Asia . . . it is a three-way, not a two-way, 
competition.”154  Indeed, the rapidly-changing dynamics in the Indian 
economy and the country’s domestic industries155 have presented some 
interesting twists to the future position of this traditional vanguard of 
the developing world.  India has also been actively establishing bilateral 
and regional trade agreements156 while being instrumental in the 
 
CHINA AND ASIA’S NEW DYNAMICS 48, 55 (David Shambaugh ed., 2006). 
 154. ROBERT KAGAN, THE RETURN OF HISTORY AND THE END OF DREAMS 41 
(2009); see also BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 4, at 88 (“[B]oth 
India and China have the potential to redefine the balance of influence and power within any 
grouping of which they are a part and the very definition of the region any new institution 
claims to represent.”); see also Jason Burke, India’s Deals with Sri Lanka Heighten Stakes in 
‘Great Game’ with Beijing, GUARDIAN (London) (June 9, 2010, 11:45 AM), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2010/jun/09/sri-lanka-india-china-great-game (“China wants 
to be the pre-eminent power in Asia and whether Asia ends up multipolar or unipolar will be 
determined by what happens in the Indian Ocean.  Currently there is a power vacuum there 
and the Chinese want to fill it.” (quoting Brahma Chellaney, Professor of Strategic Studies, 
Centre for Policy Research, New Delhi)). 
 155. See, e.g., Dwijen Rangnekar, Context and Ambiguity in the Making of Law: A 
Comment on Amending India’s Patent Act, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 365, 379–80 (2007) 
(discussing the changing dynamics of the Indian pharmaceutical industry). 
 156. As one commentator observed: 
The Indian government has negotiated a framework agreement with ASEAN whose 
ambition and scope resemble the China-ASEAN agreement.  It has also negotiated 
an economic cooperation agreement with Singapore, which could be a launching 
pad of sorts for an India-ASEAN FTA.  An FTA with Thailand is also joining the 
list.  Thanks to these and other diplomatic efforts, New Delhi now holds its own 
annual summit meeting with ASEAN in an “ASEAN + 1” arrangement, and India 
was included in the December 2005 East Asian Summit. 
Ellen L. Frost, China’s Commercial Diplomacy in Asia: Promise or Threat?, in BALANCE OF 
INFLUENCE IN ASIA, supra note 149, at 95, 99 (footnote omitted); see also Julia Ya Qin, 
China, India and WTO Law, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC 
ORDER 167, 196 (Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah & Wang Jiangyu eds., 2010) (“It was not 
until recent years that India began to enter into regional free trade arrangements with others, 
mostly its neighbouring countries.”); Wang Jiangyu, The Role of China and India in Asian 
Regionalism, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, supra, at 333, 
356–58 (discussing India’s regional trade initiatives).  But see TAY, supra note 20, at 64 
(“[India] has negotiated a free trade agreement with ASEAN, but this was subject to much 
haggling that showed not just economic differences but also that India has not observed and 
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continued development of the IBSA trilateral cooperation, featuring 
India, Brazil and South Africa.157 
Asian countries increasingly see the benefits of having India 
embraced a greater role in regional policy.  Some countries, for 
example, found it desirable to include India in the East Asian Summit to 
“provide a ‘hedge’ against Chinese dominance.”158  Many Asian 
countries have also been frustrated by the “influx of cheap Chinese 
consumer goods, competition for export markets, . . . growing trade 
deficit[s],”159 and diversion of FDI.160  Indeed, “Malaysian and 
Indonesian workers are [now] complaining about jobs being lost to 
Chinese workers because of the closing of enterprises that are losing 
orders to China.”161 
Finally, one cannot ignore the important role the United States has 
 
absorbed the social norms prevailing in ASEAN, and perhaps does not want to.  As a result, 
India remains peripheral relative to others.”). 
 157. As stated in IBSA’s website: 
Established in June 2003, IBSA [the India–Brazil–South Africa Dialogue Forum] is 
a coordinating mechanism amongst three emerging countries, three multiethnic and 
multicultural democracies, which are determined to contribute to the construction of 
a new international architecture, to bring their voice together on global issues and to 
deepen their ties in various areas. IBSA also opens itself to concrete projects of 
cooperation and partnership with less developed countries. 
IBSA Trilateral Official Website: About IBSA, http://www.ibsa-trilateral.org/ (last visited Dec. 
8, 2011). 
 158. BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 4, at 88; see also TAY, 
supra note 20, at 89 (“More and more are talking not of a ‘Chindia’ of interdependence but of 
a new Cold War between China and India.”); Guerrero, supra note 136, at 192 (“Japan and 
ASEAN members that were wary of an East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere under China’s 
leadership responded to Beijing’s diplomatic offensive by proposing the inclusion for India, 
Australia and New Zealand.”). 
 159. Joshua Eisenman, China’s Post-Cold War Strategy in Africa: Examining Beijing’s 
Methods and Objectives, in CHINA AND THE DEVELOPING WORLD, supra note 7, at 29, 42; 
accord ELLIS, supra note 7, at 1 (noting the “concern at increasing volumes of competitively 
priced Chinese goods, both contraband and legitimate, that are beating out the goods of Latin 
American producers in their own countries and displacing them in their traditional export 
markets”); Chris Alden, China’s New Engagement with Africa, in CHINA’S EXPANSION INTO 
THE WESTERN HEMISPHERE, supra note 7, at 213, 226 (noting the “concern posed by the 
arrival of low-cost consumer goods [from China], which have enabled Africans to purchase 
basic items formerly beyond their reach but that threaten local manufacturing capacity”); 
Glosny, supra note 137, at 156 (“ASEAN states are worried that with China’s low-cost and 
increasingly efficient manufacturing sector, cheaper Chinese goods will flood their domestic 
markets and compete effectively with Southeast Asian-produced goods in other markets.”); 
see also TAYLOR, CHINA’S NEW ROLE IN AFRICA, supra note 7, at 63–86 (discussing the 
impact of cheap Chinese goods in Africa). 
 160. See Glosny, supra note 137, at 159–60 (discussing ASEAN’s concerns over 
diversions of foreign direct investments). 
 161. Guerrero, supra note 136, at 194. 
NEW YU- FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  6:56 PM 
2012]     INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ASIAN VALUES 369 
 
historically played in Asia, even though the country is not on the 
continent.162  In the last few years, the Obama administration has shown 
a greater interest in Asia than its predecessor.  Secretary of State Hillary 
Clinton, for instance, set the precedent by choosing to visit Asia over 
Europe or the Middle East in her first overseas trip.163  In a speech in 
Tokyo, President Obama also described the United States as an “Asia 
Pacific nation.”164 As he declared: “As a[n] Asia Pacific nation, the 
United States expects to be involved in the discussions that shape the 
future of this region, and to participate fully in appropriate 
organizations as they are established and evolve.”165 
In fact, there have now been growing discussions about the potential 
rivalry in Asia between China and the United States.  Nevertheless, if 
such rivalry intensifies, it is very likely that Asian countries will be 
highly reluctant to enter into situations where they have to pick between 
the two countries.  As David Shambaugh pointed out: 
[H]aving to choose between Beijing and Washington as a 
primary benefactor is the nightmare scenario for the vast 
majority of Asian states. . . .  It is not an exaggeration that all 
Asian states shall seek to have sound, extensive, and cooperative 
relations with both the United States and China, and thus will do 
much to avoid being put into a bipolar dilemma.166 
Despite these concerns, there is no denying that if there is a power shift 
between the China and the United States, Asian countries will have “a 
critical role [to play] in deciding whether such a shift in the relative 
standing of the world’s two largest economies will be orderly or 
 
 162. Cf. TAY, supra note 20, at 6 (“Despite increased trade and economic integration 
among Asian countries, . . . the United States remains the final market for as much as 60 
percent of Asian production.”). 
 163. See Yu, China, U.S. Need Each Other, supra note 94; see also BERGSTEN ET AL., 
CHINA’S RISE, supra note 90, at ix (noting that Clinton’s trip to Asia “is the first time in 
decades that the maiden foreign trip by the Secretary of State in a new administration was to 
Asia and signaled the importance the Obama administration attaches to relations with the 
region”). 
 164. Remarks by President Barack Obama at Suntory Hall in Tokyo, Japan (Nov. 14, 
2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-barack-
obama-suntory-hall. 
 165. Id. 
 166. David Shambaugh, Introduction: The Rise of China and Asia’s New Dynamics, in 
POWER SHIFT, supra note 153, at 1, 17; accord Frost, supra note 156, at 105 (noting that Asian 
counties “do not wish to be forced to choose between Beijing and Washington”). 
NEW YU- FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  6:56 PM 
370  MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. [Vol. 16:2 
 
traumatic.”167 
In sum, the uncertainty within the region and the continuous rivalry 
among the Asian powers—or Asia Pacific powers, if the United States is 
included168—have made it difficult for Asian countries to foster pan-
Asian positions on intellectual property law and policy.  In the near 
future, Asian countries are very unlikely to play a role that is similar to 
that of the European Union or the African Group. 
III. CHINDIASEAN 
Although Part I has shown that distinct values, approaches, or 
practices unlikely exist in the area of intellectual property protection 
and enforcement, questions remain regarding whether Asian countries 
will eventually develop unified positions on intellectual property law 
and policy.  While the existence of Asian values, approaches, or 
practices may help develop such positions, such development does not 
depend on the existence of those values, approaches, or practices.  The 
question, therefore, is not whether those values, approaches, or 
practices exist, but whether intellectual property values, approaches, or 
practices can be Asianized.169 
To date, countries in different parts of the world have taken 
coherent positions as a regional group.  The textbook examples are the 
African Group and the European Union.  Thus far, the wide-ranging 
regional diversity has made it difficult for Asian countries to foster 
common positions.  For example, Japan was instrumental in establishing 
the TRIPS Agreement and remains a key player in the push for 
plurilateral or multilateral efforts in the international intellectual 
property arena.  It also advanced the proposal for ACTA and now 
 
 167. BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 4, at 92; cf. AMITAV 
ACHARYA, CONSTRUCTING A SECURITY COMMUNITY IN SOUTHEAST ASIA: ASEAN AND 
THE PROBLEM OF REGIONAL ORDER 224 (2001) (“The rise of China has led to prospects 
that ASEAN might either resort to balancing against, or bandwagoning with, China, the two 
postures commonly found in a realist understanding of responses to rising powers.”); Frost, 
supra note 156, at 116 (“Non-Chinese Asians welcome China’s new role [in Asia], but they 
have no desire to be dominated by China—or by Japan or India, for that matter. They see an 
actively engaged United States as a balancing and stabilizing presence that expands their 
room to maneuver and their freedom to choose.”). 
 168. Cf. id. at 16 (noting that the question over whether it is East Asia or the Asia 
Pacific “presents initial problems of organizational and analytical coherence that are not as 
pronounced” in other region). 
 169. This question, to some extent, reminds us of what Mahathir bin Mohamad, 
Malaysia’s former prime minister, sometimes called the “Asianization of Asia.”  BEESON, 
INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 4, at 76. 
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serves as the agreement’s depositary.170  Meanwhile, Singapore and 
South Korea have entered into free trade agreements with the United 
States.171  Because these high-income countries will benefit from 
stronger intellectual property protection and enforcement, they, with 
the exception of the ASEAN-affiliated Singapore, are unlikely to team 
up with their poorer neighbors to develop pan-Asian positions on 
intellectual property law and policy. 
Nevertheless, the middle- and low-income Asian countries still have 
strong incentives to team up with each other to strengthen their own 
positions.  As I mentioned earlier, the establishment of South-South 
alliances can be highly beneficial.  These alliances, for example, “will 
allow less-developed countries to shape a pro-development agenda, 
articulate more coherent positions, or even enable these countries to 
establish a united negotiating front.  The[y] . . . will also help these 
countries establish a powerful voice in the international debates on 
public health, intellectual property, and international trade.”172 
Once Japan and South Korea are taken out, the most powerful 
alliance will arise when China, India, and the ASEAN members team 
up to foster common positions for the Asian developing world.  Such an 
alliance can be described either as the China-India-ASEAN triangle or, 
in shorter form, Chindiasean.173  Chindiasean is unique, as it unites two 
leading middle-income developing countries with an Asia-based 
regional group.  (Although Singapore is a developed economy that may 
not benefit from positions taken by this regional alliance, its founding 
membership and growing leadership in ASEAN and such noneconomic 
considerations as security are likely to ensure Singapore to remain part 
of the alliance.174) 
 
 170. ACTA, supra note 87, art. 45. 
 171. See KORUS FTA, supra note 125; USSFTA, supra note 126. 
 172. Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 370. 
 173. Chindiasean builds on what Pete Engardio and his colleagues at Business Week 
described as Chindia.  CHINDIA, supra note 105.  An identical combination has also been 
advanced in the form of the Asian Economic Community.  See Michael Ewing-Chow & 
Edrick Gao, The Asian Economic Community: ASEAN—A Building or a Stumbling Block 
for China and India Economic Cooperation, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC ORDER, supra note 156, at 387, 387 (“At the first East Asia Summit . . . held in 
Kuala Lumpur on 14 December 2005, the Indian Prime Minister, Manmohan Singh, outlined 
his vision of an emerging Asian Economic Community . . . as including ASEAN, India and 
China.”). 
 174. See JURGEN HAACKE, ASEAN’S DIPLOMATIC AND SECURITY CULTURE: 
ORIGINS, DEVELOPMENT AND PROSPECTS 7 (2009) (“Singapore’s leaders have long 
associated a major potential security risk with the consequences of a breakdown of the 
normative framework governing sub-regional order in Southeast Asia.”).  See generally id. at 
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From the standpoint of international intellectual property politics, 
the existence of both China and India, the two so-called BRICS 
countries, are important.  Since the 1960s, Brazil and India have served 
as the twin leaders of the developing world in international intellectual 
property negotiations.175  Although China until recently has not become 
active in the international community, it has since picked up 
tremendous momentum.  The existence of China and India in 
Chindiasean, therefore, allows the alliance to be prominently featured 
in future international intellectual property negotiations.  In fact, given 
the immense power of both China and India, which can only grow, any 
Asian alliance that excludes them is unlikely to succeed.176 
Moreover, ASEAN can benefit from access to the Chinese and 
Indian markets as well as the influx of foreign direct investment from 
these two countries.  Although ASEAN was constituted as a group, its 
constituent countries compete more against than complement each 
other.  As Assafa Endeshaw noted recently: 
Besides the economic structures of Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Philippines and Thailand are “more competitive than 
complementary . . . ASEAN economies are more complementary 
to the industrial countries (as well as to the Asian [newly 
industrialized economies]) than to each other.  And each 
ASEAN country wants to protect its domestic industries from 
competition from neighbors”.  The overall consequence is that 
ASEAN countries, except Singapore, are “not markets for each 
other’s primary products.  And they cannot supply each other’s 
needs for technology and capital goods” . . . . 
 The disparity in levels of industrialization and the 
competitive standing of ASEAN economies inevitably translates 
into reluctance “to share markets” but an urge to protect 
“domestic industries from regional cooperation”.  The less 
developed of them tend to be more inward-looking and 
 
214 (“ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture has been meant to mediate estrangement and 
insecurity in Southeast Asia.”); TAY, supra note 20, at 51 (“[O]ne of the earliest 
achievements of ASEAN was to avoid further confrontation among its members.”). 
 175. See, e.g., Peter K. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, 35 OHIO N.U. L. 
REV. 465, 505–07 (2009) (discussing Brazil and India’s role in pushing for reforms in the 
international patent system). 
 176. Cf. Sungjoon Cho, A Bridge Too Far: The Fall of the Fifth WTO Ministerial 
Conference in Cancún and the Future of Trade Constitution, 7 J. INT’L ECON. L. 219, 235 
(2004) (“[T]he ‘China factor’ enabled the creation of the G-21 [now commonly referred to as 
the G-20] . . . . [W]ith China in their ranks, the size and impact of this coalition became 
unprecedented.”). 
NEW YU- FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  6:56 PM 
2012]     INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ASIAN VALUES 373 
 
preoccupied with the basic development problems of 
unemployment, poverty and income inequality.  They fear that 
premature competition for their industries will result in benefits 
biased in favour of the more developed members; the industrial 
competence of the latter will enable them to pre-empt the high 
value added industries and process if industrial location is left to 
market forces under free trade.177 
The existence of ASEAN in Chindiasean is equally important.  As 
mentioned in Part I.C, China and India are likely to be top competitors 
in Asia in the future.  In fact, tension may rise when the Indian economy 
begins to catch up with that of China.178  As a result, ASEAN will play 
its much-needed role in serving as a mediator between the two 
countries, taking advantage of its wide experience in building 
consensus.179  The inclusion of ASEAN will also build on its wide 
experience in intellectual property cooperation developed through the 
1995 ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property 
Cooperation.180 
 
 177. ASSAFA, supra note 75, at 66 (footnotes omitted). 
 178. See Lal, supra note 57, at 142 (“[A]s India continues to grow, if China shows 
reluctance to accord the country status as a peer in the international arena, the resulting 
friction could lead to renewed tensions.”). 
 179. See ACHARYA, supra note 167, at 79 (“The ASEAN Way . . . is a claim about a 
process of regional interactions and cooperation based on discreteness, informality, consensus 
building and non-confrontation styles which are often contrasted with the adversarial 
posturing, majority vote and other legalistic decision-making procedures in Western 
multilateral negotiations.”); BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 4, at 2 
(describing the “ASEAN Way” as an “informal, consensus-based approach to international 
cooperation”); HAACKE, supra note 174, at 7 (“ASEAN’s diplomatic and security culture 
comprises six core norms: sovereign equality, non-recourse to the use of force and the 
peaceful settlement of conflict, non-interference and non-intervention, non-involvement of 
ASEAN to address unresolved bilateral conflict between members, quiet diplomacy, and 
mutual respect and tolerance”); BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 
24, at 219 (noting that there is “very little chance of regional elites losing ‘face’” in processes 
conducted the ASEAN Way).  See generally ACHARYA, supra note 167 (providing an 
excellent discussion of ASEAN’s distinctive approach to political and security co-operation).  
But see id. at 78 (conceding that the “ASEAN Way” is “a loosely used concept whose 
meaning remains vague and contested”); BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, 
supra note 4, at 22 (discussing criticism that “the ASEAN way of voluntarism and consensus 
. . . has made it primarily an organization dedicated to conflict avoidance rather than 
resolution”); BEESON, REGIONALISM AND GLOBALIZATION, supra note 24, at 88 (“ASEAN 
is primarily a mechanism for sidelining problems regional leaders consider politically too 
difficult or sensitive.”). 
 180. ASEAN Framework Agreement on Intellectual Property Cooperation, Dec. 15, 
1995, available at http://www.asean.org/5179.htm.  For a discussion of the Framework 
Agreement by its drafter, see generally Weerawit Weeraworawit, The Harmonisation of 
Intellectual Property Rights in ASEAN, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN ASIA, supra 
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Moreover, as China and India continue to grow, their positions may 
be closer to those of developed countries than their less developed 
counterparts.  Some commentators have already wondered whether the 
emerging BRICS countries can continue to serve as leaders of the less 
developed world as they once did.181  The addition of ASEAN in 
Chindiasean, therefore, is highly important, as the positions taken by 
ASEAN are likely to be more moderate than those of the two BRICS 
countries.  Such moderation also resonates well with the large poor 
populations within China and India, thus allowing the Chinese and 
Indian governments to work closely with their ASEAN neighbors.182 
To be certain, questions remain regarding whether ASEAN 
countries can become equal partners with China and India.  Most of the 
ASEAN members are economically weak.  Those that are strong on a 
per capita basis, like Singapore, have a small economy.  Indeed, one of 
the main concerns for any partnerships between a BRICS country and 
other less developed countries is the bargaining disparity between and 
among the parties.183  If the arrangement is unfair, the ultimate alliance 
is unlikely to be more attractive than what the weaker countries already 
get under the existing multilateral system. 
Nevertheless, by combining its ten members and having an economy 
comparable to that of China and India,184 ASEAN may be able to 
 
note 57, at 247. 
 181. See, e.g., Drahos, Developing Countries, supra note 118, at 765 (“It is . . . not clear 
that India and Brazil are prepared to provide the general leadership on intellectual property 
issues that they once did.”). 
 182. Cf. Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 389 (“[T]he wide gap between the 
rich and the poor and the growing regional disparities in the BRICS countries have induced 
their government leaders to develop policies to work more closely with their poorer trading 
partners.”). 
 183. As I noted earlier: 
[T]he impending challenge for these countries concerns how to set up an alliance in 
a way that would prevent the BRICS countries from dominating their much weaker 
and more dependent partners.  After all, the former are more powerful and possess 
more human capital, technical knowledge, and legal expertise.  Without adequate 
protection, the BRICS countries may abuse their leadership roles at the expense of 
others.  Thus, if the partial BRICS alliances are to be successful, it is important to 
build safeguards into the alliances to protect the weaker members and to allow them 
to retain their autonomy and identity.  It is also important to develop trust among 
the participating members so that they can work together closely without worrying 
about potential exploitation. 
Id (footnote omitted). 
 184. See ASEAN, China and India: Comparative Economic Performance, Issues and 
Implications (ASEAN Secretariat, Studies Unit Paper No. 09–2006, 2006), available at 
http://www.aseansec.org/19006.pdf (comparing ASEAN’s economic performance and growth 
with that of China and India). 
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provide the much-needed political and economic clout to balance either 
China or India.  The regional group also provides a multitude of votes 
that are important to both countries in a “one country, one vote” system 
under the United Nations—for example, in WIPO and UNESCO.185 
To China and India, the support of ASEAN members may become 
even more important, as the coalition with ASEAN members would 
strengthen their clout in negotiations with the United States and the 
European Union.186  The combination of China, India, and ASEAN may 
also provide an effective countervailing force against the continued push 
for stronger global intellectual property standards by the trilateral 
partnership of the European Union, Japan, and the United States.187  
Even if it fails to resist this push, Chindiasean can strategically exploit 
the growing rifts among the three countries,188 thus enlarging the policy 
space of the less developed world.  As John Odell noted, a sophisticated 
negotiation strategy includes not only tactics for building coalitions, but 
also tactics “for splitting rival coalitions . . . and for defending against 
efforts by outsiders to break one’s own.”189 
 
 185. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 388 (“[N]umbers matter in a ‘one 
country, one vote’ system, like WIPO and the United Nations.  There are only five BRICS 
countries, but many more less developed countries.”). 
 186. See Robert Bird & Daniel R. Cahoy, The Impact of Compulsory Licensing on 
Foreign Direct Investment: A Collective Bargaining Approach, 45 AM. BUS. L.J. 283, 317 
(2008) (“Through the use of a collective action mechanism, it may be possible for a country 
with a certain level of immunity to share the protection with one or several countries more 
susceptible to FDI economic retribution.  The use of coordinated behavior may bring about a 
more equitable result, so long as one is aware of the legal limits of such mechanisms and the 
anticoordination strategies that may be employed by opponents of the system.”); Yu, Access 
to Medicines, supra note 6, at 367 (“[T]he creation of alliances among less developed 
countries will help many less developed countries combat the external pressure each country 
will face on a one-on-one basis from the European Communities, the United States, or other 
powerful trading partners.”). 
 187. Cf. Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 356 (“If [a coalition among the 
BRICs countries] is well built and maintained, it can even become an effective counterweight 
to the trilateral cooperation among the European Communities, Japan, and the United 
States, all of which were instrumental in pushing for the adoption of the TRIPs 
Agreement.”). 
 188. See AMRITA NARLIKAR, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES: BARGAINING COALITIONS IN THE GATT AND WTO 200 (2003) (noting that 
“[t]he Cairns Group utilized the rift within the US-EC with great skill”); Sonia E. Rolland, 
Developing Country Coalitions at the WTO: In Search of Legal Support, 48 HARV. INT’L L.J. 
483, 503 (2007) (noting the “strategic exploitation of rifts between the United States, the EU, 
and Japan”); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS and Its Discontents, 10 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 369, 
406–08 (2006) (noting the need to “explore the tension between the European Communities 
and the United States”). 
 189. John S. Odell, Introduction to NEGOTIATING TRADE: DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 
IN THE WTO AND NAFTA 1, 13 (John S. Odell ed., 2006). 
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Within Asia, an alliance with the ASEAN members would further 
strengthen their positions vis-à-vis Japan, a still dominant economic 
power in the region.190  For India, such an alliance would steer the 
discussion away from ASEAN+3 or East Asian Community.191  For 
China, such an alliance would be at least as attractive as ASEAN+3, 
although the resulting alliance would go in a rather different direction.  
Teaming up with Japan and Korea is quite different from having an 
alliance with India and ASEAN. 
Notwithstanding these many benefits, there remain some 
unavoidable challenges.  For example, there exist “IP-irrelevant 
factors”192 that would make it difficult for these countries to cooperate 
with each other, such as xenophobia, nationalism, racism, mistrust, and 
resentment.193  As I noted earlier, “[n]o matter how much more 
globalized and interdependent the world has become, some countries 
will always remain reluctant to cooperate with others, either because of 
historical conflicts, border disputes, economic rivalries, cultural 
differences, or spillover issues from other areas.”194  Indeed, the 
historical record of cooperation among less developed countries has 
been far from promising.195 
 
 190. Cf. Guerrero, supra note 136, at 191, 193. 
 191. See id. at 192 (discussing the developments regarding ASEAN+3, the East Asia 
Community, the East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, and the East Asian Summit). 
 192. “IP-irrelevant factors” are those factors that are largely unaffected by intellectual 
property protection.  See Peter K. Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, 82 IND. L.J. 
827, 852–53 (2007). 
 193. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 393.  The tension between China and 
India provides a good example.  See Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah & Wang Jiangyu, 
Introduction and Overview, in CHINA, INDIA AND THE INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC ORDER, 
supra note 156, at 1, 12 (“China still claims the area that is Arunachal Pradesh and India 
claims that some 38,000 square mile on its border are occupied by Chinese forces.”); see also 
Frost, supra note 156, at 98 (“Indian officials remain suspicious of China’s intentions and 
hope to track and if possible match its initiatives.”). 
 194. Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 393. 
 195. See id. at 388 (“[C]oalition-building efforts put up by less developed countries 
historically have failed.”); Jean Touscoz, A Changing Policy Landscape, in INTERNATIONAL 
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER: THE ORIGINS AND AFTERMATH OF THE UNITED NATIONS 
NEGOTIATIONS ON A DRAFT CODE OF CONDUCT 287, 288 (Surendra J. Patel et al. eds., 
2001) (“[T]he ‘big five’ non-members of OECD (Russia, China, Brazil, India and Indonesia) 
do not always act in concert; the least developed countries themselves do not present a 
common front.”).  As Frederick Abbott elaborated: 
Over the past 50 years, there have been a number of efforts to achieve solidarity or 
common positions among developing countries in international forums.  At the 
broad multilateral level there was (and are) the Group of 77, and the movement for 
a New International Economic Order.  At the regional level, the Andean Pact in the 
early 1970s developed a rather sophisticated common plan to address technology 
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Moreover, ASEAN members continue to compete with China and 
India.  As Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore’s founding leader, observed in 
2004, “[w]hat will pull [ASEAN] together is the need to be sufficiently 
competitive against two huge countries now in the World Trade 
Organisation and wanting to industrialise and join the export markets: 
India and China.”196  There are also additional questions concerning 
whether the region will have “enough political and ideological internal 
coherence to allow it to facilitate and encourage the underlying 
economic integration that has already occurred,”197 including regional 
harmonization in the intellectual property area.198 
Nonetheless, on balance, Chindiasean seems to be beneficial to all 
parties.  First and foremost, such an alliance allows China, India, and 
ASEAN to achieve what they alone cannot.  In the near future, the 
positions of China, India, and ASEAN would also remain quite close to 
each other.  In the area of technology transfer and technical assistance, 
for example, this group of countries would “serve as worthy allies at 
least until their interests grow further apart from those of their less 
developed partners.”199 
Thus, it is not surprising that China and India have already begun to 
coordinate their positions to maximize leverage and effectiveness of 
their international negotiations.  In the June 2010 meeting of the TRIPS 
Council, for example, the two countries joined hands in raising concerns 
about the development of TRIPS-plus enforcement trends.200  Their 
 
and IP issues (ie Decisions 84 and 85).  Yet these efforts were largely unsuccessful in 
shifting the balance of negotiating leverage away from developed countries.  In fact, 
developing country common efforts to reform the Paris Convention in the late 1970s 
and early 1980s are routinely cited as the triggering event for movement of 
intellectual property negotiations to the GATT. 
Frederick Abbott, The Future of IPRs in the Multilateral Trading System, in TRADING IN 
KNOWLEDGE: DEVELOPMENT PERSPECTIVES ON TRIPS, TRADE AND SUSTAINABILITY 36, 
42 (Christophe Bellmann et al. eds., 2003). 
 196. LLEWELLYN, supra note 76, at 121–22. 
 197. BEESON, INSTITUTIONS OF THE ASIA-PACIFIC, supra note 4, at 16. 
 198. See ASSAFA, supra note 75, at 66 (“[G]iven the wide disparity in levels of 
industrialization and the competitive standing of the ASEAN economies], any IP 
harmonization will clash with some of the member states’ policies of maintaining protection 
of local markets and industries.  This is simply because harmonization of IP will have the 
inevitable effect of breaking down some of the barriers.”). 
 199. Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 392. 
 200. Council for Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights [TRIPS 
Council], Minutes of Meeting ¶¶ 248–73, IP/C/M/63 (Oct. 4, 2010) [hereinafter TRIPS Council 
Minutes]; see also Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, 18 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 479, 518–21 (2011) 
(discussing China and India’s interventions at the TRIPS Council); The Problems with the 
“TRIPS plus” Enforcement Trend: China’s View, S. BULL., 28 July 2010, at 13 (collecting the 
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important interventions were a direct response to the release of the 
draft text of the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement as well as the 
growing concern over the systematic problems created by the high 
intellectual property enforcement standards established through 
bilateral, plurilateral, and regional trade agreements.201  A few years 
earlier, China and India also served as cosponsors of the proposal to 
introduce a new article 29bis in the TRIPS Agreement,202 which would 
create an obligation to disclose in patent applications the source of 
origin of the biological resources and traditional knowledge used in 
patent-seeking inventions.203 
IV. AGENDA 
While the previous Part focuses on the establishment of Chindiasean 
as a geopolitical alliance, this Part turns to its ability to shape global 
intellectual property norms.  To a large extent, Chindiasean could serve 
as an alternative locus of intellectual property norm making.204  It could 
also become what Professor Tay described as “Asia’s normative 
community.”205  The development of such a community is important, 
because a coherent common policy agenda will help the Chindiasean 
member states achieve a more powerful voice, greater political leverage, 
and more desirable bargaining outcomes.  The shared regional norms 
will also help bind the members together, notwithstanding the 
challenges mentioned earlier in the previous Part. 
If Chindiasean is to pursue a coherent policy agenda, one has to 
wonder what items this agenda will contain.  To help identify these 
 
speech for China’s intervention); see also TRIPS Council, Communication from India, 
Intervention on TRIPS plus Enforcement Trends (June 9, 2010), reprinted in Why “IPR 
Enforcement” in ACTA & FTAs Harm the South, S. BULL., 28 July 2010, at 10 (collecting the 
speech for India’s intervention). 
 201. See TRIPS Council Minutes, supra note 200, ¶¶ 250, 264. 
 202. See Communication from Brazil, China, Colombia, Cuba, India, Pakistan, Peru, 
Thailand and Tanzania, Doha Work Programme—The Outstanding Implementation Issue on 
the Relationship Between the TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological 
Diversity, WT/GC/W/564/Rev.2 (July 5, 2006) [hereinafter Article 29bis Proposal]. 
 203. See id. ¶ 2 (requiring patent applicants to “disclose the country providing the 
resources and/or associated traditional knowledge, from whom in the providing country they 
were obtained, and, as known after reasonable inquiry, the country of origin”). 
 204. Cf. Meredith Kolsky Lewis, The Trans-Pacific Partnership: New Paradigm or Wolf 
in Sheep’s Clothing?, 34 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 27, 28–29 (2011) (noting that the Trans-
Pacific Partnership Agreement has the potential to “provide an alternative power center 
within Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) in ways that are distinct from the models 
that have been jockeying for favor the past several years” (footnote omitted)). 
 205. TAY, supra note 20, at 150–58 (discussing Asia’s normative community). 
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potential items, this Part examines issues that are of great importance to 
China, India, and ASEAN.  Part III.A focuses on traditional issues that 
are already under discussion in the international intellectual property 
arena.  Part III.B discusses new issues that have only emerged recently 
and on which Chindiasean could have a major impact. 
A. Traditional Issues 
1. Enforcement 
Enforcement will remain a key issue for many Asian countries in at 
least the next decade.  As I noted elsewhere, the enforcement 
mechanisms available under the TRIPS Agreement are rather weak.206  
In the view of developed countries and intellectual property right 
holders, the mechanisms are just primitive, obsolete, and inadequate.207  
To some extent, Part III of the TRIPS Agreement can be seen as the 
Agreement’s “Achilles’ heel.”208  There remain many historical, 
economic, tactical, disciplinary, and technological challenges to 
improving enforcement within the WTO—or in the present context, 
within Asia. 
Moreover, many Chindiasean members are now on the United 
States Trade Representative’s Section 301 watch list or priority watch 
list (see table 3).  Due to such constant external pressure, these 
countries have a strong need to develop a collective response, 
 
 206. See generally Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, supra note 200, at 483–504 
(discussing the weakness of the TRIPS enforcement provisions). 
 207. See, e.g., EUROPEAN COMMISSION, DIRECTORATE GENERAL FOR TRADE, 
STRATEGY FOR THE ENFORCEMENT OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THIRD 
COUNTRIES 3 (2005), available at http://trade.ec.europa.eu/ 
doclib/docs/2005/april/tradoc_122636.pdf (“Violations of intellectual property rights (IPR) 
continue to increase, having reached, in recent years, industrial proportions.  This happens 
despite the fact that, by now, most of the WTO members have adopted legislation 
implementing minimum standards of IPR enforcement.”); TIMOTHY P. TRAINER & VICKI E. 
ALLUMS, PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS ACROSS BORDERS 4 (2008) 
(noting that “it has become apparent to some national governments and regional 
organizations that the ‘aggressive’ enforcement provisions of TRIPS, particularly the border 
measures, have fallen short of expectations of providing an effective system of thwarting 
international movement of infringing goods”); Timothy P. Trainer, Intellectual Property 
Enforcement: A Reality Gap (Insufficient Assistance, Ineffective Implementation)?, 8 J. 
MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 47 (2008) (discussing the inadequacies of the 
enforcement provisions of the TRIPS Agreement and explaining the need for TRIPS-plus 
bilateral and regional free trade agreements in the area of border enforcement). 
 208. See J.H. Reichman & David Lange, Bargaining Around the TRIPS Agreement: 
The Case for Ongoing Public-Private Initiatives to Facilitate Worldwide Intellectual Property 
Transactions, 9 DUKE J. COMP. & INT’L L. 11, 34 (1998); Yu, TRIPS and Its Achilles’ Heel, 
supra note 200. 
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coordinate negotiation and litigation strategies, and establish a forum 
for sharing experience, knowledge, and best practices.  A more 
coordinated regional approach toward intellectual property 
enforcement therefore will benefit all Chindiasean members. 
 
Country 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 
Brunei          WL WL WL 
China 306 306 306 306 OCR PWL PWL PWL PWL PWL PWL 
India PWL PWL PWL PWL PWLL PWL PWL PWL PWL PWL PWL 
Indonesia PWL PWL PWL PWL PWL PWL WL WL PWL PWL PWL 
Malaysia PWL WL WL WL WL WL WL WL WL WL WL 
Pakistan WL WL WL PWL PWL WL WL PWL PWL PWL PWL 
Philippines PWL PWL PWL PWL PWL WL WL WL WL WL WL 
S. Korea PWL WL WL PWL WL WL WL WL    
Taiwan PWL PWL PWL PWL WL WL WL WL    
Thailand WL WL WL WL WL WL PWL PWL PWL PWL PWL 
Vietnam WL WL WL WL WL WL WL WL WL WL WL 
WL=“Watch List”  PWL=“Priority Watch List”  306=Section 306 Review  OCR=Out-of-Cycle Review 
Table 3: United States Trade Representative’s Special 301 Actions209 
 
2. Traditional Knowledge and Cultural Expressions 
The protection of traditional knowledge and cultural expressions is 
of great importance to many Asian countries.  India, for example, is 
concerned about protecting its traditional knowledge, cultural heritage, 
and genetic resources.210  Its biodiversity law remains one of the most 
comprehensive and well-drafted laws in the region.211  Meanwhile, China 
 
 209. The data were taken from the annual Special 301 reports issued by the Office of 
the United States Trade Representative. 
 210. See COMM’N ON INTELLECTUAL PROP. RIGHTS, INTEGRATING INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY RIGHTS AND DEVELOPMENT POLICY: REPORT OF THE COMMISSION ON 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS 76 (2002) (discussing the controversies over patent 
protection involving turmeric and the neem tree). 
 211. See Tanuja Garde, India, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN ASIA, supra note 121, 
at 55, 78 n.108 (stating that the 2002 National Biodiversity Act “addresses access to genetic 
resources and associated knowledge by foreign entities to provide for benefit sharing from 
the use of the resources, and also establishes the National Biodiversity Authority”). 
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pays considerable attention to protecting traditional herbal medicines.212  
It has also recognized the importance of protecting intangible cultural 
heritage.  In February 2011, China adopted a new intangible cultural 
heritage law.213  Apart from China and India, ASEAN countries also 
have important traditional knowledge and cultural expressions to 
protect.214  Examples include “headbands and skirts made from 
paperbark by Dayak groups in the interior of Borneo or in the 
complicated designs and weaving techniques for silk textiles, batik, 
brocade weaving and embroidery in countries like Thailand and 
Indonesia.”215 
In July 2006, a group of less developed countries advanced the 
proposal for a new article 29bis of the TRIPS Agreement.216  Out of the 
nine sponsors, five of them are from Asia (Brazil, China, India, 
Pakistan, and Thailand).217  Although it is unclear how long it will take 
the WTO membership to adopt this proposal, considering the large 
number of countries that have yet to ratify the protocol to amend the 
TRIPS Agreement in the public health area,218 the discussion of 
protection for traditional knowledge and genetic resources within the 
TRIPS context underscores the view that the TRIPS Agreement and the 
existing international intellectual property system provide inadequate 
protection to non-Western interests.219 
It is also worth noting the momentum created by the recent adoption 
of the Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair 
 
 212. See LI, supra note 102, at 35–36 (discussing the protection of traditional Chinese 
medicines); Li Xuan & Li Weiwei, Inadequacy of Patent Regime on Traditional Medicinal 
Knowledge—A Diagnosis of 13-Year Traditional Medicinal Knowledge Patent Experience in 
China, 10 J. WORLD INTELL. PROP. 125 (2007) (examining the protection of traditional 
Chinese medicines). 
 213. Intangible Cultural Heritage Law of the People’s Republic of China (promulgated 
by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Feb. 25, 2011, effective June 1, 2011) (P.R.C.), 
available at http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=215503. 
 214. See Draft ASEAN Framework Agreement on Access to Biological and Genetic 
Resources, reprinted in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW IN ASIA, supra note 57, at 261. 
 215. Christoph Antons, What Is “Traditional Cultural Expression”?—International 
Definitions and Their Application in Developing Asia, 1 WIPO J. 103, 105–06 (2009). 
 216. Article 29bis Proposal, supra note 202. 
 217. Id. 
 218. See Members Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WTO, 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/amendment_e.htm (Jan. 5, 2012). 
 219. See Bellagio Declaration, reprinted in JAMES BOYLE, SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND 
SPLEENS: LAW AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY 192, 193 (1996) 
(noting the lack of protection for “custodians of tribal culture and medical knowledge, 
collectives practicing traditional artistic and musical forms, or peasant cultivators of valuable 
seed varieties”). 
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and Equitable Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization.220  
Adopted on October 29, 2010, this new protocol aims to promote fair 
and equitable sharing of benefits arising from the utilization of genetic 
resources, thereby contributing to the conservation and the sustainable 
use of biological diversity.221  Like the Bonn Guidelines on Access to 
Genetic Resources and Fair and Equitable Sharing of the Benefits 
Arising out of Their Utilization,222 this new protocol will further 
strengthen Chindiasean’s position with respect to greater disclosure in 
patent applications of the traditional knowledge and genetic resources 
used in patent-seeking inventions. 
3. Geographical Indications 
The protection of geographical indications is quite important to 
many Asian countries.  These countries continue to be dissatisfied with 
the fact that geographical indications are protected in a manner that 
favor primarily developed countries.  For example, articles 22–23 of the 
TRIPS Agreement provide substantial protection to geographical 
indications for wines and spirits.223  Yet, they ignore the needs of many 
Asian developing countries, such as the need for stronger protection for 
geographical indications of food products grown primarily on their 
soil.224 
 
 220. Nagoya Protocol on Access to Genetic Resources and the Fair and Equitable 
Sharing of Benefits Arising from Their Utilization, Oct. 29, 2010, available at 
http://www.cbd.int/abs/doc/protocol/nagoya-protocol-en.pdf. 
 221. Id. art. 1. 
 222. As stated in the Bonn Guidelines: 
Contracting Parties with users of genetic resources under their jurisdiction should 
take appropriate legal, administrative, or policy measures, as appropriate, to support 
compliance with prior informed consent of the Contracting Party providing such 
resources and mutually agreed terms on which access was granted. These countries 
could consider . . . [m]easures to encourage the disclosure of the country of origin of 
the genetic resources and of the origin of traditional knowledge, innovations and 
practices of indigenous and local communities in applications for intellectual 
property rights . . . . 
Secretariat of the CBD, Bonn Guidelines on Access to Genetic Resources and Fair and 
Equitable Sharing of the Benefits Arising out of Their Utilization 16(d)(2) (2002), available at 
http://www.cbd.int/doc/publications/cbd-bonn-gdls-en.pdf; see also BRYAN BACHNER, 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND CHINA: THE MODERNIZATION OF TRADITIONAL 
KNOWLEDGE 22–23 (2009) (noting that the Bonn Guidelines were “approved by the CBD’s 
Conference of Parties . . . with a view to help countries that were drafting Access and Benefit 
Sharing . . . legislation”). 
 223. TRIPS Agreement arts. 23–24. 
 224. See KEITH E. MASKUS, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS IN THE GLOBAL 
ECONOMY 239 (2000) (“[T]he evolving language in TRIPS on geographical indications 
remains largely . . . confined to wines and spirits, while many developing countries point to 
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In recent years, many Asian countries have begun to notice the vast 
benefits of geographical indications.225  As a means to resolve the 
impasse over geographical indications, Hong Kong advanced “an 
alternative model for the establishment of a multilateral system of 
notification and registration of geographical indications for wines and 
spirits under Article 23.4 of the TRIPS Agreement.”226  Together with 
other WTO members, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka also called on the 
WTO to extend the protection of geographical indications from wines 
and spirits to all products.227  If the discussion of the protection for 
traditional knowledge and cultural expressions is eventually tied to that 
for geographical indications—arguably the most practical compromise 
to link the European Union with the African Group—Asian countries 
are likely to play a rather important role in establishing greater 
protection for geographical indications. 
4. Access to Essential Medicines 
Since the expiration of the transitional period for developing 
countries in the TRIPS Agreement on January 1, 2005, access to 
essential medicines has been a major agenda item for any intellectual 
property discussions involving the developing world.  The discussion of 
such access eventually culminated in the adoption of the Doha 
 
food products that could be protected to their advantage, such as Basmati rice and Darjeeling 
tea.”). 
 225. See, e.g., PHILIPPE CULLET, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY PROTECTION AND 
SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT 333–37 (2005) (discussing how geographical indications can 
serve as a tool for protecting traditional knowledge); Dwijen Rangnekar, Indications of 
Geographical Origin in Asia: Legal and Policy Issues to Resolve, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT: DEVELOPMENT AGENDAS IN A CHANGING 
WORLD 273, 273 (Ricardo Meléndez-Ortiz & Pedro Roffe eds., 2009) (noting that 
geographical indications “are increasingly being seen as useful intellectual property rights for 
developing countries”); Madhavi Sunder, The Invention of Traditional Knowledge, LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS., Spring 2007, at 97, 110 (“Mysore silk sarees . . . have had a makeover 
since obtaining a geographical indication, updating [their] look with trendy new (but 
interestingly, natural) colors . . . and ‘contemporary’ designs inspired by temple architecture 
and tribal jewelry.”). 
 226. TRIPS Council, Communication from Hong Kong, China, Multilateral System of 
Notification and Registration of Geographical Indications Under Article 23.4 of the TRIPS 
Agreement ¶ 3, TN/IP/W/8 (Apr. 23, 2003). 
 227. See TRIPS Council, Proposal from Bulgaria, Cuba, the Czech Republic, Egypt, 
Iceland, India, Jamaica, Kenya, Liechtenstein, Mauritius, Nigeria, Pakistan, Slovenia, Sri 
Lanka, Switzerland, Turkey and Venezuela ¶ 20, IP/C/W/247/Rev.1 (May 17, 2001) (“The 
extension of the level of protection of geographical indications for wines and spirits to 
geographical indications for all other products is in the best interest and to the benefit of all 
WTO Members . . . .”). 
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Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public Health228 and the 
protocol to amend the TRIPS Agreement.229  If ratified by two-thirds of 
the WTO membership,230 the protocol will add a new article 31bis to the 
TRIPS Agreement, which will allow countries with insufficient or no 
manufacturing capacity to import generic versions of on-patent 
pharmaceuticals.231 
The debate on access to essential medicines is of particular 
importance to India, which has a very strong generic pharmaceutical 
industry.232  It is also important to China and Thailand, which are now 
major producers of active pharmaceutical ingredients and have taken on 
a growing role in the generic market, not to mention the ongoing public 
health needs in these countries and their Asian neighbors.233  To the 
disappointment of the multinational pharmaceutical industry, Thailand, 
along with Brazil, introduced compulsory licenses to increase access to 
needed pharmaceuticals.234  If its efforts continue and spread to other 
countries, the discussion of compulsory licensing arrangement in the 
 
 228. World Trade Organization, Declaration on the TRIPS Agreement and Public 
Health, WT/MIN(01)/DEC/2, 41 I.L.M. 755 (2002) [hereinafter Doha Declaration]. 
 229. General Council, Amendment of the TRIPS Agreement, WT/L/641 (Dec. 8, 2005), 
available at http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/trips_e/wtl641_e.htm [hereinafter TRIPS 
Amendment]. 
 230. Although the initial deadline for ratification was set at December 1, 2007, it has 
been extended three times to December 2013.  Countries Accepting Amendment of the TRIPS 
Agreement, supra note 218.  As of this writing, more than a third of the 153 WTO member 
states, including the United States, India, Japan, China, and members of the European 
Union, have ratified the proposed amendment. 
 231. See TRIPS Amendment, supra note 229; see also Yu, The International Enclosure 
Movement, supra note 192, at 872–86 (tracing the development of proposed article 31bis of 
the TRIPS Agreement). 
 232. See CHAUDHURI, supra note 109, at 180–221. 
 233. See Yu, Access to Medicines, supra note 6, at 363 (“Although China has yet to be 
as aggressive as India in exporting drugs or as successful as Brazil in promoting public health 
within the country, it already is the world’s largest producer of active pharmaceutical 
ingredients and is likely to be a very important player in the generic market.”); see also LI, 
supra note 102, at 54 (“Some Chinese researchers believe that China has advantages in 
producing ‘me too’ drugs because its capacity to conduct organic synthesis is very strong after 
many years of China’s being the target for outsourced MPC [multinational pharmaceutical 
companies’] business.”); ELLEN F.M. ’T HOEN, THE GLOBAL POLITICS OF 
PHARMACEUTICAL MONOPOLY POWER: DRUG PATENTS, ACCESS, INNOVATION AND THE 
APPLICATION OF THE WTO DOHA DECLARATION ON TRIPS AND PUBLIC HEALTH 67 
(2009) (“[M]iddle-income developing countries are important not only for the size of their 
markets but also because they have the production capacity to supply generic medicines in 
the developing world.”). 
 234. See id. at 44–50 (discussing Brazil and Thailand’s use of compulsory licenses and 
government use orders); Yu, The International Enclosure Movement, supra note 192, at 843–
49 (discussing the use of compulsory licenses in Brazil). 
NEW YU- FORMATTED (DO NOT DELETE) 4/18/2012  6:56 PM 
2012]     INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND ASIAN VALUES 385 
 
public health context and ways to promote innovation in the 
pharmaceutical area is likely to feature prominently on Chindiasean’s 
policy agenda. 
5. Internet and Other New Technologies 
When the TRIPS Agreement was established in the mid-1990s, just 
shortly before the internet and electronic commerce entered the 
mainstream, its substantive standards were set at what Daniel Gervais 
described as “the highest common denominator among major 
industrialized countries as of 1991.”235  As a result, the Agreement failed 
to address challenges created by new technologies that emerged after 
the completion of its primary draft,236 including the technological change 
brought about by the internet and information revolution.237 
To date, the internet, new communications technologies, and file-
sharing networks have posed significant challenges to intellectual 
property enforcement in the digital environment.238  While internet-
related enforcement problems can be found everywhere, Asian 
countries play a critically important role in the larger debate, for at least 
three reasons. 
First, China already has the world’s largest internet population, 
which amounted to over 513 million users in December 2011 according 
 
 235. Daniel J. Gervais, The TRIPS Agreement and the Doha Round: History and 
Impact on Economic Development, in 4 INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND INFORMATION 
WEALTH, supra note 91, at 23, 43. 
 236. See id. at 29 (“The 1992 text was not extensively modified and became the basis 
for the TRIPS Agreement adopted at Marrakesh on April 15, 1994.”). 
 237. See Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated, and 
Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 613, 614–15 (1996) (“Despite its broad sweep 
and its unstated aspirations, TRIPS arrives on the scene already outdated.  TRIPS reached 
fruition at the same time that the on-line era became irrevocable.  Yet it makes no 
concession, not even a nod, to the fact that a significant portion of the international 
intellectual property market will soon be conducted on-line.”); see also J.H. Reichman, The 
Know-How Gap in the TRIPS Agreement: Why Software Fared Badly, and What Are the 
Solutions, 17 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 763, 766 (1995) (“[The principal weakness of the 
TRIPS Agreement] stems from the drafters’ technical inability and political reluctance to 
address the problems facing innovators and investors at work on important new technologies 
in an Age of Information.  The drafters’ decision to stuff these new technologies into the 
overworked and increasingly obsolete patent and copyright paradigms simply ignores the 
systemic contradictions and economic disutilities this same approach was already generating 
in the domestic intellectual property systems.” (footnote omitted)). 
 238. For discussions of the massive unauthorized copying problem created by peer-to-
peer technology, see generally Peter K. Yu, The Escalating Copyright Wars, 32 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 907 (2004); Peter K. Yu, P2P and the Future of Private Copying, 76 U. COLO. L. REV. 
653 (2005). 
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to official statistics.239  If the growth continues, internet-related 
developments in China are likely to overwhelm that of the world.  As I 
have noted often, the important question about the internet in China is 
not only how the internet will change China, but also how China will 
change the internet.240 
Moreover, according to Internet World Stats, in December 2011, 
India already has a population of over 121 million, exceeding that of 
Japan.241  For the same period, Chindiasean made up for more than a 
third of the world’s internet population and has already exceeded that 
of the United States and the European Union combined (see table 4).  If 
the growth trend continues, it is only a matter of time before 


























 239. See CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER, 29TH STATISTICAL 
SURVEY REPORT ON THE INTERNET DEVELOPMENT IN CHINA 4 (2012), available at 
http://www1.cnnic.cn/uploadfiles/pdf/2012/2/27/112543.pdf [hereinafter CNNIC SURVEY 
REPORT]. 
 240. See, e.g., Yu, Six Secret Fears, supra note 88, at 1046. 
 241. Internet Usage in Asia, INTERNET WORLD STATS, 
http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats3.htm (last visited Apr. 11, 2011). 
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Table 4: Internet Population (As of Dec. 31, 2011)242 
 
Second, due to late economic development and technological 
backwardness, a substantial portion of internet users are school- or 
college-age students.243  In China, for example, internet users aged below 
thirty made up close to sixty percent of the total internet population.244  
Thus, any law and policy relating to the internet is likely to have a 
substantial impact on the future pillars in the country.245  As far as 
internet-related law reforms are concerned, the stakes may be higher 
 
 242. The data was taken or calculated from Internet World Stats, which is available at 
http://www.internetworldstats.com. 
 243. See Wei Yanliang & Feng Xiaoqing, Comments on Cyber Copyright Disputes in 
the People’s Republic of China: Maintaining the Status Quo While Expanding the Doctrine of 
Profit-Making Purposes, 7 MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 149, 150–51 (2003) (discussing how 
most online infringers in China are poor students). 
 244. CNNIC SURVEY REPORT, supra note 239, at 19. 
 245. See Peter K. Yu, Digital Copyright Reform and Legal Transplants in Hong Kong, 
48 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 693, 705 (2010) [hereinafter Yu, Digital Copyright Reform] 
(discussing how criminalizing online file sharing can adversely impact “a large number of 
individuals, including youngsters who are the future pillars of society”). 
Country Internet Population Penetration Rate 
China 513,100,000 38.4% 
India 121,000,000 10.2% 
Brunei Darussalam 318,900 79.4% 
Cambodia 449,160 3.1% 
Indonesia 55,000,000 22.4% 
Laos 527,400 8.1% 
Malaysia 17,723,000 61.7% 
Myanmar 110,000 0.2% 
Philippines 29,700,000 29.2% 
Singapore 3,658,400 77.2% 
Thailand 18,310,000 27.4% 
Vietnam 30,516,587 33.7% 
CHINDIASEAN VS WORLD / UNITED STATES / EUROPEAN UNION 
Chindiasean 790,413,447 25.18% 
World 2,267,233,742 32.7% 
United States 245,203,319 78.3% 
European Union 359,530,110 71.5% 
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than that of other type of intellectual property law reforms. 
Third, many Asian countries, which range from China to Malaysia to 
Singapore, continue to control the flow of information within society.  
While human rights activists and commentators have heavily criticized 
the censorship regimes within these countries,246 these regimes ironically 
may provide the infrastructure needed to strengthen enforcement in the 
digital environment.  These countries therefore may provide alternative 
models that may not exist in Western countries, although it remains to 
be seen whether such models would be compatible with free speech, 
free press, and privacy values found in other countries.247 
B. New Issues 
1. Climate Change 
One of the hottest issues in the international intellectual property 
policy arena concerns the use of intellectual property law and policy to 
respond to global climate change.  Although it remains unclear what 
responses countries can come up with, China and India—two powerful 
countries that have significant carbon emissions—undoubtedly will play 
very important roles in any international climate change negotiations.  
The Copenhagen Summit already provides a very good example of the 
important role China can play in environment-related discussions.248  
Capabilities for the development of climate change technology have 
also emerged in China, India, and other Asian countries.249 
 
 246. See ACCESS DENIED: THE PRACTICE AND POLICY OF GLOBAL INTERNET 
FILTERING 155–65 (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008) (examining internet filtering in Asia); 
see id. at 240–44, 263–71, 286–99, 325–28, 338–59, 364–74, 390–94, 420–24 (documenting 
internet filtering in Afghanistan, China, India, Iran, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal, North Korea, 
Pakistan, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, and Vietnam). 
 247. See Yu, The Graduated Response, 62 FLA. L. REV. 1373, 1401–02 (2010) 
(discussing how the graduated response system would undermine the protection of free 
speech, free press, and privacy); Yu, Digital Copyright Reform, supra note 245, at 715 
(discussing how the proposed disclosure and retention mechanism in Hong Kong’s digital 
copyright reform would chill speech). 
 248. See Steve Charnovitz et al., GLOBAL WARMING AND THE WORLD TRADING 
SYSTEM 93–94 (2009); Peter K. Yu, What Copenhagen Could Signal About U.S., China, DES 
MOINES REG., Dec. 17, 2009; see also TAY, supra note 20, at 154 (“It is clear that Asia’s 
continuing economic growth, while important for many, can have negative impacts on the 
environment and climate change for the planet.”). 
 249. See EUR. PATENT OFFICE, U.N. ENV’T PROGRAMME & INT’L CTR. FOR TRADE 
& SUSTAINABLE DEV., PATENTS AND CLEAN ENERGY: BRIDGING THE GAP BETWEEN 
EVIDENCE AND POLICY: FINAL REPORT 32 (2010) (“In the photovoltaic sector, for example, 
China has one of the largest producers and manufacturers, while India has one of the leading 
producers and manufacturers in wind technology. Meanwhile Thailand has significant activity 
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Moreover, because climate change discussions can lead to new 
innovation solutions that did not exist in the past, Chindiasean can also 
play a very important role in shaping the ongoing policy debate.  As 
Peter Drahos pointed out, the increasing demands for policy adjustment 
to the global climate change requires “the US and China . . . to think 
about [the climate change, energy, and intellectual property rights 
regimes] in an integrated way.”250  By linking intellectual property law 
and policy to environmental law regimes, Chindiasean may be able to 
come up with new practical home-grown solutions that will receive more 
buy-in from China and India at the international level. 
Those solutions are likely important to many Asian countries, which 
have significant population and resources in areas that are vulnerable to 
floods, hurricanes, typhoons, tsunamis, severe droughts, or 
desertification.251  If the intellectual property system is not better 
managed to address climate change, those countries may suffer 
significantly.  The tsunamis in Thailand, Indonesia, and other coastal 
areas in December 2004 and the vast damage resulting from such 
catastrophes remain vivid memories for many Asians.252 
2. Alternative Innovation Models 
Although the existing intellectual property system focuses primarily 
on pathbreaking creations and innovations, many Asian countries have 
embraced sequential and cumulative innovations.253  For example, utility 
 
in the sectors of both photovoltaic and wind technologies.”); id. at 34 (“In geothermal 
technology China has made a significant entry into the field, virtually matching the patenting 
rates of the UK, Sweden and Italy. If these trends continue, China is likely to emerge as a key 
patenting country in these fields.”). 
 250. Peter Drahos, The China-US Relationship on Climate Change, Intellectual 
Property and CCS: Requiem for a Species?, 1 WIPO J. 125, 130 (2009). 
 251. See Jody Freeman & Andrew Guzman, Climate Change and U.S. Interests, 109 
COLUM. L. REV. 1531, 1535 (2009). 
 252. See Robert D. Mcfadden, Walls of Water Sweeping All in Their Path: Families, 
Communities, Livelihoods, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2004, at A10 (reporting about the tsunamis 
in Asia); Amy Waldman, Thousands Die as Quake-Spawned Waves Crash onto Coastlines 
Across Southern Asia, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 27, 2004, at A1 (same). 
 253. See Hiroyuki Odagiri et al., IPR and the Catch-Up Process in Japan, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, DEVELOPMENT, AND CATCH-UP, supra note 121, at 95, 
126 (“In indigenous sectors with mostly tiny firms [in Japan], many innovations occur in the 
form of practical devices rather than pure inventions.”); Reichman, supra note 16, at 1124 
(distinguishing between “cumulative and sequential innovation” and “path-breaking 
innovation” and noting that “how to protect cumulative and sequential innovation—as 
distinct from path-breaking innovation—becomes an ever more pressing problem as more 
small- and medium-sized firms acquire a taste and capacity for such innovation”); see also 
SUZANNE SCOTCHMER, INNOVATION AND INCENTIVES 127–59 (2004) (discussing sequential 
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models or petty patents remain an important feature of the intellectual 
property systems in many of these countries.254  As Assafa Endeshaw 
described: 
[Within Asia, t]here are different approaches towards minor 
inventions and their terms of protection as well as that for 
patents.  Thus Indonesia accords protection to small product 
improvements through a “Simple Patent” (obviously a “petty 
patent”) for one time of five years.  Vietnam, on the other hand, 
grants protection for “Utility Solutions” for six years.  By 
contrast, Malaysia recognizes “Utility Innovations” for a period 
of five years but renewable for a further five.  The Philippines 
recognizes design patents (which include utility models) and 
protects them for five years, too, but with a possibility of 
renewals for two consecutive periods of five years.255 
In recent years, a shanzhai culture emerged in China, raising 
challenging questions about the acceptable boundaries of sequential and 
cumulative innovation.256  While many intellectual property rights 
holders and commentators consider the shanzhai phenomenon highly 
undesirable, shanzhai products do offer some benefits, especially when 
the products provide improvements that otherwise would not occur.  In 
a world where intellectual property rights holders are sometimes 
reluctant to undertake innovation, shanzhai products may provide the 
much-needed work around to advance technological developments.  
Shanzhai products, indeed, may provide an efficient means for Asian 
countries to catch up with their more developed trading partners.  It 
may also allow nationals of those countries to appropriate the 
consumers’ surplus.257 
 
innovation and the need to protect cumulative innovators). 
 254. See, e.g., Preston M. Torbert & Zhao Jia, People’s Republic of China, in 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 128, at 233, 238 (discussing 
utility models and designs in China); Jacinto D. Jimenez, Philippines, in INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, supra note 128, at 270 (discussing designs and utility models 
in the Philippines); Joon K. Park, South Korea, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST 
ASIA, supra note 128, at 337, 337 (noting the adoption of the Utility Model Act in South 
Korea); Michael F. Fedrick, Taiwan, in INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAWS OF EAST ASIA, 
supra note 128, at 389–90 (discussing the utility model patent protection in Taiwan). 
 255. ASSAFA, supra note 75, at 73. 
 256. “Originally, shan zhai was used to refer to a bandit stronghold outside 
government control [in imperial China]; today it is shorthand for a multitude of knockoffs, 
fakes, and pirated products.  These include everything from mobile phones to medicine and 
movies to makeup, and they permeate China’s consumer markets.”  TSE, supra note 4, at 79. 
 257. See Peter K. Yu, Enforcement, Economics and Estimates, 2 WIPO J. 1, 12 (2010) 
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More importantly, the continued development of shanzhai products 
may suggest the existence of an alternative path to innovation.258  Like 
the Beijing Consensus,259 China’s innovation models may attract the 
attention of other countries that are working hard to catch up with 
developed countries.  Indeed, commentators have begun to appreciate 
the different forms of innovation that are slowly emerging in China.  
While Zeng Ming and Peter Williamson discussed what they called “cost 
innovation,”260 Tan Yinglan focused on “process innovation.”261 
Dan Breznitz and Michael Murphree went even further in their 
recent book, Run of the Red Queen.262  As they pointed out, “China’s 
innovation capabilities are not solely in process (or incremental) 
innovation but also in the organization of production, manufacturing 
techniques and technologies, delivery, design, and second-generation 
innovation.”263  Interestingly, the authors concluded that these other 
forms of innovation can complement the breakthrough innovation 
embraced by the United States and other developed countries.264  As 
Breznitz and Murphree insightfully observed: 
China needed Apple to develop the concept and definition of the 
iPod and the iPhone, but Apple cannot produce and sell these 
products without China.  In the world of flexible mass 
production, the Red Queen country [referring to China or 
countries with a similar innovation model] needs the novel-
 
(“Because the infringing goods in these situations are of the same standard, or close to that 
standard, the unauthorised production of those goods may actually result in a consumers’ 
surplus:  consumers are now getting the same products for a much lower price.”). 
 258. See TSE, supra note 4, at 79 (“The best shan zhai firms, which have established 
themselves not through thievery but through knockoffs and imitations, have also disrupted 
the status quo by inventing new and ingenious business strategies tailored specifically to local 
markets.”); id. at 80 (noting that shanzhai firms “have short cycle times for new product 
introductions”). 
 259. See generally RAMO, supra note 9 (advancing the concept of the Beijing 
Consensus); see also HALPER, supra note 9 (discussing the Beijing Consensus). 
 260. See generally ZENG MING & PETER J. WILLIAMSON, DRAGONS AT YOUR DOOR: 
HOW CHINESE COST INNOVATION IS DISRUPTING GLOBAL COMPETITION (2007) 
(advancing the concept of cost innovation and discussing its global implications). 
 261. TAN YINGLAN, CHINNOVATION: HOW CHINESE INNOVATORS ARE CHANGING 
THE WORLD xii (2011). 
 262. DAN BREZNITZ & MICHAEL MURPHREE, RUN OF THE RED QUEEN: 
GOVERNMENT, INNOVATION, GLOBALIZATION, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH IN CHINA 4 
(2011). 
 263. Id. at 4. 
 264. See id. at 206 (“[T]hanks to the fragmentation of production, the rise of China 
need not be seen as a zero-sum game by policy makers inside and outside the country.”). 
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product innovators to keep churning out new ideas, and the 
novel-product-innovating countries need the Red Queen country 
to keep innovating on almost every aspect of production and 
delivery.265 
3. Special and Differential Treatment 
In the past, special and differential treatment was developed to 
enable less developed countries to promote internal economic, social, 
cultural, and technological developments and to facilitate efforts to 
catch up with countries in the developed world.  Although the TRIPS 
Agreement sought to build a super-size-fits-all template, by now it has 
been clear that such a template does not work well in the less developed 
world.  It is also worth noting that the proponents of reforms to 
strengthen intellectual property protection and enforcement sometimes 
have ignored both the preamble266 and objectives of the TRIPS 
Agreement.267 
Indeed, the problems created by the TRIPS Agreement and the 
international intellectual property system have led to the establishment 
of many new development agendas at the WTO, WIPO, and in other 
forums governing public health, human rights, biological diversity, food 
and agriculture, and information and communications.268  At the WTO, 
for example, the Doha Development Round of Trade Negotiations was 
launched in November 2001 to facilitate greater cooperation between 
developed and less developed countries.269  Of notable importance was 
the adoption of the Doha Ministerial Declaration (“Ministerial 
 
 265. Id. at 18. 
 266. See TRIPS Agreement pmbl., recital 6 (explicitly recognizing “the special needs of 
the least-developed country Members in respect of maximum flexibility in the domestic 
implementation of laws and regulations in order to enable them to create a sound and viable 
technological base”); Peter K. Yu, TRIPS Enforcement and Developing Countries, 26 AM. U. 
INT’L L. REV. 726, 747–48 (2011) (discussing the portion of the preamble of the TRIPS 
Agreement that focuses on the interests of less developed countries). 
 267. See TRIPS Agreement art. 7 (“The protection and enforcement of intellectual 
property rights should contribute to the promotion of technological innovation and to the 
transfer and dissemination of technology, to the mutual advantage of producers and users of 
technological knowledge and in a manner conducive to social and economic welfare, and to a 
balance of rights and obligations.”); see also Peter K. Yu, The Objectives and Principles of the 
TRIPS Agreement, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 979, 1000–08 (2009) [hereinafter Yu, Objectives and 
Principles] (discussing article 7 of the TRIPS Agreement). 
 268. See Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, supra note 175, at 511–40. 
 269. See, e.g., Louise Amoore et al., Series Preface to NARLIKAR, supra note 188, at xiii 
(noting that the launch of the Doha Round was “assisted to a large degree by the conciliatory 
international political climate that followed the September 2001 terrorist attacks in New York 
and Washington”). 
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Declaration”),270 the Doha Declaration,271 and a new protocol to amend 
the TRIPS Agreement.272 
At WIPO, Argentina and Brazil also called for the establishment of 
a Development Agenda.273  Together with other less developed 
countries and civil society organizations, they successfully demanded 
reforms that sought to both enhance the development dimension of 
WIPO and restore the balance in the international intellectual property 
system.274  The agenda, which was adopted at the WIPO General 
Assembly in October 2007,275 now includes forty-five recommendations 
for action that range from technical assistance and capacity building to 
norm setting and public policy and from technology transfer to 
assessment, evaluation, and impact studies.276 
To some extent, the ongoing demands for special and differential 
treatment in the international intellectual property system are similar to 
the push for a greater “margin of appreciation” within the international 
human rights regime.277  These demands, indeed, recall many of the 
 
 270. Word Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, 
WT/MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746 (2002).  Paragraph 19 of the Ministerial Declaration 
specifically instructed the TRIPS Council “to examine . . . the relationship between the 
TRIPS Agreement and the Convention on Biological Diversity [and] the protection of 
traditional knowledge and folklore.”  Id. ¶ 19. 
 271. Doha Declaration, supra note 228; see also Yu, The International Enclosure 
Movement, supra note 192, at 872–74 (discussing the Doha Declaration). 
 272. TRIPS Amendment, supra note 229; See Yu, The International Enclosure 
Movement, supra note 192, at 881–86 (discussing the proposed article 31bis of the TRIPS 
Agreement). 
 273. WIPO, Proposal to Establish a Development Agenda for WIPO: An Elaboration 
of Issues Raised in Document, WO/GA/31/11, IIM/1/4 (Apr. 6, 2005), available at 
http://www.wipo.int/edocs/mdocs/mdocs/en/iim_1/iim_1_4.pdf. 
 274. See Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, supra note 175, at 519–20 
(discussing the two lines of reforms that were included in the WIPO Development Agenda). 
 275. Press Release, WIPO, Member States Adopt a Development Agenda for WIPO 
(Oct. 1, 2007), available at http://www.wipo.int/pressroom/en/articles/2007/article 0071.html; 
see also Ruth L. Okediji, History Lessons for the WIPO Development Agenda, in THE 
DEVELOPMENT AGENDA: GLOBAL INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND DEVELOPING 
COUNTRIES 137, 152 (Neil Weinstock Netanel ed., 2009) (noting that “the Development 
Agenda is framed as a regime of special and differential . . . treatment for [developing and 
least developed countries]”). 
 276. See The 45 Adopted Recommendations Under the WIPO Development Agenda, 
WIPO, http://www.wipo.int/ip-development/en/agenda/recommendations.html (last visited 
July 6, 2008) (listing all the 45 recommendations).  The six different clusters include:  (1) 
technical assistance and capacity building; (2) norm-setting, flexibilities, public policy and 
public domain; (3) technology transfer, information and communication technologies and 
access to knowledge; (4) assessment, evaluation and impact studies; (5) institutional matters 
including mandate and governance; and (6) other issues.  Id. 
 277. As Laurence Helfer explained: 
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relativist discussions prevalent in the “Asian values” debate.278  As 
intellectual property and human rights become increasingly linked to 
each other in international policy discussions, the right to 
development279 and the right to culture,280 the two rights to which Asian 
 
The doctrine is essentially the degree of discretion that the ECHR is willing to grant 
national decision makers who seek to fulfill their human rights obligations under the 
treaty.  Although initially framed as requiring a decision in favor of a state where a 
government’s decision to declare a public emergency (and thus to suspend most of 
its human rights obligations) was “on the margin” of compatibility with the treaty, 
the margin of appreciation doctrine has, over time, become a more limited tool by 
which the Court permits states a modicum of breathing room in balancing the 
protection of civil and political liberties against other pressing societal concerns.  
What is most striking about the margin of appreciation is that it expressly 
contemplates that international treaty obligations originating from a unitary text 
may be interpreted in different ways in different states.  Although partially in 
tension with autonomous and effective interpretations of the treaty, the doctrine has 
become an essential ingredient of the ECHR’s success in fashioning an effective 
system of adjudication.  Given that most of the rights and freedoms protected by the 
European Convention are not protected unconditionally, but rather expressly 
permit states to impose restrictions for specified reasons and under certain 
conditions, the Court must be sensitive to the fact that different acts of national 
balancing may be compatible with the treaty.  Thus, although the effectiveness 
principle requires that restrictions on protected liberties must be construed 
narrowly, the ECHR has held that states “enjoy a certain margin of appreciation in 
assessing whether and to what extent an interference is necessary.”  Only after 
granting such discretion will the Court exercise its independent “European 
supervision” to the relevant legislation and the decisions applying it. 
Laurence R. Helfer, Adjudicating Copyright Claims Under the TRIPS Agreement: The Case 
for a European Human Rights Analogy, 39 HARV. INT’L L.J. 357, 404–05 (1998) (footnotes 
omitted). 
 278. See discussion supra Part I.A. 
 279. Article 2(3) of the Declaration on the Right to Development, for example, 
provides: 
States have the right and the duty to formulate appropriate national development 
policies that aim at the constant improvement of the well-being of the entire 
population and of all individuals, on the basis of their active, free and meaningful 
participation in development and in the fair distribution of the benefits resulting 
therefrom. 
Declaration on the Right to Development art. 2(3), G.A. Res. 41/128, U.N. GAOR, 41st 
Sess., Supp. No. 53, at 186, U.N. Doc. A/41/53 (1986). 
 280. With respect to the protection of intangible cultural heritage, an issue that is of 
great importance to many less developed countries in Asia, article 31(1) of the United 
Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples further declares: 
Indigenous peoples have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop their 
cultural heritage, traditional knowledge and traditional cultural expressions, as well 
as the manifestations of their sciences, technologies and cultures, including human 
and genetic resources, seeds, medicines, knowledge of the properties of fauna and 
flora, oral traditions, literatures, designs, sports and traditional games and visual and 
performing arts. They also have the right to maintain, control, protect and develop 
their intellectual property over such cultural heritage, traditional knowledge, and 
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countries have paid special attention, are likely to become important 
features of the future international intellectual property debate.281 
4. Uneven Economic and Technological Developments 
Uneven development is a major characteristic of the less developed 
world, in particular the rapidly-growing emerging countries such as 
China and India and those with a significant gap between the rich and 
the poor.  As I noted elsewhere in the case of China, the many conflicts 
and competing interests within China are likely to drive the country’s 
leaders to develop a “schizophrenic” nationwide intellectual property 
policy.282  While the country wants stronger protection for its fast-
growing industries, it prefers weaker protection in fields related to 
 
traditional cultural expressions. 
United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples art. 31(1), U.N. Doc. 
A/RES/61/295 (Sept. 13, 2007), available at http://www.un.org/esa/socdev 
/unpfii/documents/DRIPS_en.pdf. 
 281. In chronological order, the recent U.N. documents addressing the interface 
between intellectual property and human rights include: Intellectual Property Rights and 
Human Rights, Sub-Comm’n on Human Rights Res. 2000/7, U.N. Doc. 
E/CN.4/Sub.2/RES/2000/7 (Aug. 17, 2000), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/ 
Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/c462b62cf8a07b13c12569700046704e?Opendocument; The High 
Commissioner, Report of the High Commissioner on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights: 
The Impact of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights on 
Human Rights, delivered to the Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human 
Rights, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2001/13 (June 27, 2001), available at 
http://www.unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/e06a5300f90fa0238025668700518ca4/59051610
4e92e87bc1256aa8004a8191/$FILE/G0114345.pdf; Comm. on Econ., Soc. & Cultural Rights, 
General Comment No. 17: The Right of Everyone to Benefit from the Protection of the Moral 
and Material Interests Resulting from Any Scientific, Literary or Artistic Production of Which 
He Is the Author (Article 15, Paragraph 1(c), of the Covenant), U.N. Doc. E/C.12/GC/17 (Jan. 
12, 2006), available at http://www.unhchr.ch/tbs/doc.nsf/898586b1dc7b4043c1256a450044f331/ 
03902145edbbe797c125711500584ea8/$ FILE/G0640060.pdf.  For a discussion of these 
documents, see Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, supra note 175, at 522–27.  For 
discussions of the interface between human rights and intellectual property, see generally 
WILLEM GROSHEIDE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A PARADOX 
(2010); LAURENCE R. HELFER & GRAEME W. AUSTIN, HUMAN RIGHTS AND 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY: MAPPING THE GLOBAL INTERFACE (2011); INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (Paul L.C. Torremans ed., 2008); WIPO, INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY AND HUMAN RIGHTS (1998); Audrey R. Chapman, Core Obligations Related to 
ICESCR Article 15(1)(c), in CORE OBLIGATIONS: BUILDING A FRAMEWORK FOR 
ECONOMIC, SOCIAL AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 305, 315 (Audrey Chapman & Sage Russell 
eds., 2002); Laurence R. Helfer, Toward a Human Rights Framework for Intellectual 
Property, 40 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 971 (2007); Peter K. Yu, Intellectual Property and Human 
Rights in the Nonmultilateral Era, 64 FLA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2012); Yu, Reconceptualizing 
Intellectual Property Interests, supra note 28; Peter K. Yu, Ten Common Questions About 
Intellectual Property and Human Rights, 23 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 709 (2007). 
 282. Peter K. Yu, International Enclosure, the Regime Complex, and Intellectual 
Property Schizophrenia, 2007 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1, 25–26. 
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pharmaceuticals, chemicals, fertilizers, seeds, and foodstuffs, due to its 
huge population, continued economic dependence on agriculture, the 
leaders’ worries about public health issues, and their concerns about the 
people’s overall well-being.283 
Interestingly, the challenges confronting China can be found in other 
similarly-situated countries, which range from India to Indonesia.  As 
Fareed Zakaria observed, “India might have several Silicon Valleys, but 
it also has three Nigerias within it—that is, more than 300 million people 
living on less than a dollar a day.  It is home to 40 percent of the world’s 
poor and has the world’s second-largest HIV-positive population.”284  
Indeed, “many middle-income developing countries . . . may want 
stronger protection for their fast-growing industries and highly 
economically developed regions, they want weaker protection in the 
remaining areas.”285  Given the complexity of the various economies in 
Chindiasean, the group may be able to draw on their own experience 
and problems to develop solutions that address the uneven development 
problems.  Such solutions may be useful for the other less developed 
countries outside the regional alliance, such as Brazil and South Africa. 
5. Abuse of Rights and Restraint on Trade 
Less developed countries, most notably Brazil and India, have long 
held positions that call for the provision of safeguards against the abuse 
of intellectual property rights and restraints on trade.  As Brazil 
declared in a submission to the TRIPS Negotiating Group: 
When one speaks of “rights” of intellectual property owners, one 
is automatically bound to deal with the subject of “obligations” 
of these owners. 
 The objective of such obligations which deserves priority 
attention is to allow greater access to technological innovation 
for IPR users.  If the whole attention of the discussions is 
centered on the interests of IPR owners, the balance of the entire 
IPR system is not taken into account.286 
 
 283. See id. at 25. 
 284. ZAKARIA, supra note 3, at 133; see also VINAY RAI & WILLIAM L. SIMON, THINK 
INDIA: THE RISE OF THE WORLD’S NEXT SUPERPOWER AND WHAT IT MEANS FOR EVERY 
AMERICAN 211 (2007) (“One India wants.  The Other India hopes.  One India leads.  The 
Other India follows.” (italics omitted)). 
 285. Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, supra note 175, at 559. 
 286. Negotiating Group on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights, 
Including Trade in Counterfeit Goods [TRIPS Negotiating Group], Submission from Brazil ¶ 
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During the TRIPS negotiations, India further reminded the delegates 
that “it was only the restrictive and anti-competitive practices of the 
owners of the IPRs that could be considered to be trade-related because 
they alone distorted or impeded international trade.”287 
With China and India as its key constituents, Chindiasean is likely to 
call for a recalibration of the balance in the international intellectual 
property system by demanding a greater emphasis on not only rights but 
also responsibilities.  For example, they could demand greater 
protection against the abuse of rights and restraints on trade.  Such 
positions are well supported by the text and the negotiating history of 
the TRIPS Agreement, which already includes many provisions 
targeting abuse of rights or process and restraints on trade or 
competition.288  The preamble of the TRIPS Agreement memorialized 
the negotiators’ desire to “reduce distortions and impediments to 
international trade . . . and to ensure that measures and procedures to 
enforce intellectual property rights do not themselves become barriers 
to legitimate trade.”289  Article 8.2 further states that “[a]ppropriate 
measures . . . may be needed to prevent the abuse of intellectual 
property rights by right holders or the resort to practices which 
unreasonably restrain trade or adversely affect the international transfer 
of technology.”290 
C. Summary 
In sum, many issues can find themselves on to Chindiasean’s policy 
agenda.  Some of these issues are traditional issues advanced by less 
developed countries, many of which were under negotiation before even 
the establishment of the TRIPS Agreement.291  Others, however, are 
new issues on which the international community has yet to achieve a 
consensus or about which countries have not formulated a position.  
 
12, MTN.GNG/NG11/W/30 (Oct. 31, 1988). 
 287. TRIPS Negotiating Group, Meeting of Negotiating Group of 12–14 July 1989: 
Note by the Secretariat ¶ 4, MTN.GNG/NG11/14 (Sept. 12, 1989). 
 288. See, e.g., TRIPS Agreement pmbl., recital 1; id. arts. 8.2, 40.1, 40.2, 41.1, 48.1, 50.3, 
53, 63.1, 67. 
 289. Id. pmbl., recital 1. 
 290. Id. art. 8.2 (emphasis added); see also Yu, Objectives and Principles, supra note 
267, at 1016–18 (discussing article 8.2 of the TRIPS Agreement). 
 291. See Yu, A Tale of Two Development Agendas, supra note 175, at 468–511 
(discussing the demands of less developed countries as they relate to the development of the 
Stockholm Protocol Regarding Developing Countries, the formation of WIPO as a 
specialized agency of the United Nations, the adoption of the draft International Code of 
Conduct on the Transfer of Technology, and the revision of the Paris Convention). 
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Because it remains unclear whether these issues will actually be 
negotiated along the divide between developed and less developed 
countries, Chindiasean would have an opportunity to shape the 
negotiation of many of these issues. 
Even more interestingly, because the Chindiasean members have 
very diverse backgrounds, technological capabilities, and innovation 
paths, the positions they take are likely to be quite different from those 
of developed countries.  As I noted in the inaugural issue of The WIPO 
Journal, “[I]t is premature to assume that less-developed countries, once 
developed, will always want the existing international intellectual 
property system.  There is a good chance that they may want or need 
something rather different!”292  In effect, Chindiasean may set 
alternative paths that provide other less developed countries, including 
those outside Asia, with some attractive policy choices.  The positions 
Chindiasean takes therefore may help provide the much-needed 
momentum for reforms within the existing international intellectual 
property system, similar to the role played by Brazil and India a few 
decades ago. 
V. CONCLUSION 
This Article has shown that, in the area of intellectual property law 
and policy, one can neither locate any underlying distinct values, 
approaches, or practices nor identify established pan-Asian positions.  
Nevertheless, the middle- and low-income Asian countries may be able 
to work together to foster regional positions to influence future 
international intellectual property negotiations.  While Japan and, to 
some extent, South Korea are unlikely to join other Asian countries in 
taking a strong pro-development stand for Asia, China, India, and 
ASEAN could team up to maximize their leverage and voice in the 
international intellectual property arena.  They could help shape the 
development of a powerful regional normative community. 
Although the positions and interests of the twelve members of 
Chindiasean continue to differ, developing a united front for these 
countries most certainly will help ensure a more desirable bargaining 
outcome in areas that range from the reshaping of global intellectual 
property enforcement norms to the protection of traditional knowledge 
and cultural expressions to the promotion of access to essential 
medicines.  Having unified positions among these countries may also set 
 
 292. Peter K. Yu, The Global Intellectual Property Order and Its Undetermined Future, 
1 WIPO J. 1, 15 (2009). 
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alternative paths for other less developed countries outside Asia.  Thus, 
from the standpoint of international intellectual property policymaking, 
the growing intellectual property developments in Asia deserve our 
greater scholarly attention, even if this century does not end up 
becoming an Asian century. 
 
